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Abstract
This paper develops a theory of contracting among founders of a new firm. It asks at what
stage founders agree to commit to each other, how they structure optimal founder contracts,
and how this affects team formation, ownership, incentives, and performance. The paper
derives a trade-off between upfront contracting, which can result in teams with ineffective
founders, versus delayed contracting, which can enable some founders to appropriate ideas
and start their own firms. Delayed contracting becomes more attractive when there are
significant doubts about the skills of founders. Contingent contracts with vesting of shares
may be used to mitigate inefficiencies in the team formation process. Interestingly we show
that outside investors cannot easily undo ex-post inefficient founder agreements. We also
show that laws that provide protection to implied partnerships may have the unintended
effect of encouraging more formal contracting.
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1 Introduction
What determines a founder’s ownership within a team? At what stage are founders selected
and their stakes defined? And does it matter if there are several founders vying for each other’s
ownership stakes? At least in Hollywood the answer is ‘Yes’! The main plot of ‘The Social
Network’ revolves around a lawsuit by the Winklevoss twins. They claim to have been in a
partnership with Mark Zuckerberg, who allegedly stole their idea when starting Facebook.
In this paper we examine how founder conflicts affect financial outcomes of start-up compa-
nies. We consider a model of the founding process, and ask at what stage it becomes optimal for
founders to contract with each other, and what kind of contracts they write. We then examine
how this affects team composition, ownership, incentives, and firm performance.
Standard reasoning holds that agents write (possibly incomplete) contracts ex-ante, before
engaging in any joint activities. Company founders should thus agree on a contractual frame-
work upfront: this allows them to establish ownership shares, and to draw up firms boundaries
that provide some protection of the intellectual property (trough trade secret laws), and possibly
some protection against founder desertion (through non-compete clauses). In reality, however,
there can be problems with ‘tying the knot’ too early. Consider the example of ‘Zipcar’, a pi-
oneering US car sharing company: The two founders agreed to a fifty-fifty equity split at the
start, prior to knowing much about each other. It soon became apparent that one partner was
much more capable and committed than the other. The capable partner did not have the funds
to buy out the ineffective partner. She was therefore stuck with the original agreement that gave
her only half of the company, yet she was doing all the work (Hart, Roberts and Stevens, 2005).
The Zipcar example illustrates that there may be benefits of delaying the contracting until
founders know more about each other. Vivek Khuller, the founder of Smartix, explains this
further (Wasserman, 2009, p. 10):
"When you’ve worked with your co-founders before, it may make sense to divvy
things up upfront because the trust is there and the information is there. But when
the team doesn’t know each other very well, where there are different domains,
where you have little history of working together, it’s best to delay it because things
are still unknown and changing."
The palpable attraction of waiting before contracting is to avoid being obligated to an inef-
fective partner. However, the lack of contractual obligations can also lead to significant prob-
lems. One partner may be able to take advantage of the other, essentially stealing jointly-
developed ideas and implementing them alone. This is what the Winklevoss twins claimed.
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Our objective is to build a tractable model of the founding process that can explain how
founder contracts affect ownership, incentives and firm performance. In our model there are
two risk-neutral and wealth-constrained founders. They have a choice between contracting
either at the beginning, when there is uncertainty about tasks and their respective skills, or at a
later point in time, when the uncertainty is resolved. In the theory of the firm it is standard to
assume that firm boundaries are determined ex-ante. In this paper we ask when it is optimal to
make these decisions.
We assume that the entrepreneurial process involves the generation of new ideas that are
appropriable. One of the main reasons for contracting early is to prevent opportunistic idea
stealing. We assume that the establishment of a jointly-owned firm prevents founders from
stealing each other’s idea. However, ideas by themselves are worthless; they need to be com-
mercialized. This requires that founders apply skilled effort to a set of tasks. We want a theory
where founder teams are endogenous, so that the team composition is a reflection of underlying
founder skills. For this we consider a value-creation process where there are two complemen-
tary tasks – production and marketing for example. Each task is essential, but it does not matter
who performs it. Team formation is endogenous: depending on founder skills the two tasks
can be performed either by a single founder, or by a team of two founders. Performing a task
requires both effort and skill. We use a standard private effort model, where each founder can
choose how much effort to provide, and how to allocate effort across the two tasks.
In order to capture the problem that founders have to start working together before knowing
much about each other (as seen in the Zipcar and Smartix examples above), our model intro-
duces ex-ante uncertainty about the founders’ skills. Initially little is known about the details of
the required tasks, so founders are unable to ascertain how good they are at performing them.
For tractability we assume that skills are binary: a founder either can or cannot perform a spe-
cific task. Ex-ante the two founders have some probability of being good at their primary task
(e.g., founderA at production and founderB at marketing), and some lower probability of being
good at the other task (e.g., founder A at marketing and founder B at production). If a founder
turns out to be good at both, we call him a generalist. If he is good at only one, we call him a
specialist. If he is good at neither, we call him ineffective (relative to the required tasks).
As long as founders have ex-post symmetric skills, the timing of contracting turns out to be
irrelevant. Differences arise when there are ex-post asymmetries. Consider upfront contracting.
All is well if one partner turns out to be a generalist and the other a specialist. We call this a
dream team, because both partners contribute valuable skills to the venture. The upfront con-
tract prevents idea stealing and therefore preserves such a dream team. What if one partner is
a generalist, and the other an ineffective partner? The generalist does all the work but the inef-
fective partner shares in the profits – just like in the Zipcar example. Depending on parameter
2
values, the ineffective partner may or may not voluntarily give up some ownership to enhance
the generalist’s incentives; but the ineffective partner would never give up all his ownership,
which would be required for joint efficiency. Importantly, the wealth constraint prevents the
generalist from buying out the ineffective partner. We call this a dud team.
With delayed contracting, the generalist will start a firm alone if the other partner is inef-
fective. Doing so is efficient in terms of maximizing joint utility. However, if one founder is a
generalist and the other a specialist, then the generalist (but not the specialist!) can threaten to
‘steal’ the idea. Depending on the model parameters, the generalist either goes alone, or uses his
threat to negotiate a larger ownership share. The outcome is inefficient in that the generalist’s
utility gains are always smaller than the specialist’s losses.
The benefit of upfront contracting is the preservation of dream teams, but the cost is the
preservation of dud teams. Delayed contracting has the opposite effect, allowing a generalist to
leave an ineffective partner, but also allowing for idea stealing. The relative costs and benefits
of upfront contracting depend on the uncertainty about the founders’ task-specific skills. If
founders are likely to have the required skills, upfront contracting is optimal as it helps to protect
dream teams. However, if there is a significant probability that founders lack the required skills,
then it is optimal to delay the contracting in order to avoid dud teams.
The trade-off between early and late contracting clearly depends on some contractual incom-
pleteness. Specifically our model assumes that the realization of founders’ task-specific skills is
observable to the founders but not verifiable by third parties. Maskin and Tirole (1999) derive
conditions for a general mechanism that effectively completes incomplete contracts. However,
these conditions are not satisfied in our model, the main reason being that our binding wealth
constraints limit the off-the-equilibrium-path penalties that are essential for the Maskin and Ti-
role mechanism to work.1 The question remains whether there are other mechanisms that could
address the contractual incompleteness. We focus on a mechanism that has both theoretical and
empirical foundations. On the empirical side, Wasserman (2012) reports that founder teams
sometimes agree to vesting agreements, where the allocation of founder shares is contingent on
the achievement of pre-defined milestones. To theoretically model such contingent contracts,
we build on the work of Aghion and Bolton (1992) where the true state of nature is not verifi-
able, but where there are imperfect signals that are correlated with the true state. This modeling
approach allows us to capture the notion that milestones are imperfect measures of underlying
founder skills. To see how signals can improve the contract efficiency, consider the case where
one founder has a good signal and the other a bad signal. Suppose for simplicity that there is
1The recent work of Aghion et al. (2012) also shows that mechanisms using subgame perfect implementation
(including the Maskin and Tirole mechanism) are not robust to small perturbations in the common knowledge
assumption.
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‘full vesting’ where the founder with the bad signal loses all of his equity. If the signals are
correct, they help to avoid the dud scenario. However, if they are incorrect, they may cause
irreversible harm, most notably if they give a generalist the opportunity to get rid of a specialist.
The better the signals, the more the initial contract makes use of vesting schedules, and the more
founders prefer upfront contracting with contingent cash flow rights over delayed contracting.
Our model requires that founders are wealth-constrained. We contend that this is a realistic
assumption for many start-ups. Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002), for example, report
that on average 82% of the wealth of owner-managers is tied up within their companies. This
average includes owners of long established firms, implying that start-up entrepreneurs hold
even less or no wealth at all outside of their business. While typical founders may thus not
have significant wealth outside of their company, the question remains whether they can use
the assets within their companies to make transfer payments. We show that if a company has a
secure asset with a guaranteed liquidation value, then it is possible to structure simple financial
contracts that either partially or fully remedy the inefficiencies within teams. For example, a
generalist may raise a secured loan against the firms assets and use the proceeds to buy out an
ineffective partner. If the liquidation value is sufficiently large (small), then the generalist can
buy back all (only some) of the equity, and thereby eliminate all (only some) of the inefficiencies
in a dud team. The main issue for most start-ups is that at the beginning there have no or very
few assets that would hold any liquidation value.
In the absence of founder personal wealth or inside liquidation value, we may ask if outside
investors can relax the binding wealth constraint. The empirical work by Robb and Robinson
(2013) documents how entrepreneurs raise outside financing. They show that most of outside
funding comes in the form of secured debt that is backed by assets or personal guarantees.
Typically this outside funding is used for investment, not for buying out ineffective partners.
In our model we ask whether entrepreneurs (with no wealth and no collateralizable assets) can
obtain unsecured outside financing for buying out partners? Interestingly we find that it is never
optimal to raise outside funding by issuing a risky claim (either equity or risky debt) for the
purpose of making transfer payments amongst founders. For example, if a generalist issues
equity to fund a buyout of an ineffective partner, he has to dilute his ownership, which lowers
his performance incentives. We show that the new inefficiencies from outside funding are at
least as large as the old inefficiencies that the outside capital is meant to solve. More generally,
investors in our model distinguish between funding productive investments versus buyouts. A
willingness to invest in the firm does not imply a willingness to also finance a founder buyout.
What does our model say about Mark Zuckerberg and the Winklevoss twins? The interesting
issue here is that while Mark Zuckerberg never formally agreed to form a company, he was still
sued for not respecting an ‘implied partnership’. In fact, courts regularly admit arguments about
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‘implied partnership’, thereby muddying the distinction between the presence and absence of
founder contracts. Presumably the courts want to protect naïve founders who are unaware about
the need for contracting, but this can have ramifications for informed rational founders. We
derive a result that is counter-intuitive at first: The more courts try to protect (naïve) founders
who do not consider contracts, the more they push (sophisticated) founders into writing formal
contracts upfront. Formally, we show that recognition of implied partnerships makes delayed
contracting less attractive. This is because the ‘dud’ problem becomes relevant not only for
upfront contracting, but also for delayed contracting. The model shows that some founders,
who initially would have appreciated the flexibility of delayed contracting, are forced to switch
to upfront contracting.
2 Related Literature
The analysis of founder contracts is novel, but our study naturally builds on a variety of prior
literatures. First, our analysis draws on the theory of the firm literature. Closest is the work by
Aghion and Tirole (1994), which examines how the allocation of property rights affects incen-
tives for innovation. They also focus on early-stage innovative activities, and also emphasize the
inefficiencies caused by wealth constraints. However, their paper differs in several important
respects. First, they consider an inherently asymmetric set-up with a wealth-constrained innova-
tor and an unconstrained innovation user; we consider a partnership between ex-ante symmetric
and wealth-constrained partners. Their results are driven by specific investments, much in the
spirit of Grossman and Hart (1986). Our results do not require any specific investments at
all. They also impose incompleteness of contracts, whereas we examine an endogenous choice
between upfront versus delayed contracting.2
A closely related paper is by Aghion and Bolton (1992), who also make use of ex-post
wealth constraints. Their model has a different set-up (namely the financing of a company by
outside investors), and also relies on private benefits as a source of ex-post inefficiencies. In
our model, the ex-post inefficiencies are derived from a moral hazard problem in teams. In fact,
our model embeds the standard team incentive problem (Holmström, 1982) into a multi-task
environment (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991; Itoh, 1991).
The trade-off between upfront and delayed contracting is naturally related to the literature
on contract incompleteness. There is a lively debate in the literature about the foundations for
incomplete contracts. Our contribution is not about these foundations themselves; we impose
some incompleteness by assuming that skills are observable but not verifiable. However, our
2A similar set of comments also applies to the comparison of our paper with Hart and Moore (1994).
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analysis does provide new insights into the trade-off between having an incomplete contract
versus having no contract at all.
Our model is related to the literature on idea appropriability, dating back to the seminal
work of Arrow (1962). Anton and Yao (1994, 1995) show how inventors can limit the extent
of users appropriating their inventions, using the threat of leaking information to the users’
competitors. Gans and Stern (2000) show how the threat of appropriation can delay innova-
tors’ decisions to engage in cooperative development agreements. Gans, Hsu, and Stern (2002)
provide related empirical evidence. Ueda (2004) argues that venture capitalists are in a better
position to appropriate ideas than banks. Hellmann and Perotti (2011) compare how markets
and firms differ in terms of the circulation of appropriable idea. A common element across all
these papers is the question of how different parties can forge partnerships in an environment
where ideas can easily be stolen. The typical assumption is that the other party can always steal
the idea, but may not do so in equilibrium. In our model we derive the ability to steal ideas from
a more fundamental skill constellation. As a consequence we endogenously derive under what
circumstances stealing does or does not occur in equilibrium.
There is a literature on the economics of partnerships and teams. Much of this literature as-
sumes a constant team size, and therefore ignores team formation issues. Interesting exceptions
are Franco, Mitchell, and Vereshchagina (2011), who focus on how team incentive problems
may affect how individuals are matched into teams; and Demougin and Fabel (2007), who ex-
amine optimal contracts for a match-maker that brings together a team composed of an inventor
and a manager. Furthermore, Hellmann and Thiele (2013) consider a related model of vertical
integration where the initial partners may want to switch to alternative partners ex-post.
The question of what skills are required for starting a new firm features prominently in
the literature on the decision to become an entrepreneur. Lazear (2005) provides a theory and
empirical evidence for the importance of generalist skills for starting new ventures - see also
Åstebro, Chen, and Thompson (2011). One limitation of this literature is that it assumes that
all entrepreneurs are solo founders, and therefore fails to recognize the trade-off between solo
founders versus founding teams.
There is a relatively small literature on founding teams. In a broad cross-section of US
start-ups, Ruef, Aldrich, and Carter (2003) find that 52% have founder teams. In a sample
of high-technology start-ups, Wasserman (2012) finds that 84% have founder teams. Wuchty,
Jones, and Uzzi (2007) argue that the increased specialization of scientists explains the dramatic
rise of coauthor teams in scientific research. Åstebro and Serrano (2011) find that partnerships
significantly outperform solo founders, even after controlling for selection effects. Finally,
Hellmann and Wasserman (2012) provide evidence that equal splitting can be a sign of conflict
avoidance, especially in asymmetric teams.
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Date 0 Date 1 Date 2 Date 3
Decision on whether 
to write a contract 
(upfront contracting)
Development of skills
Renegotiation of 
upfront contract, or 
writing new contract 
(delayed contracting)
Private efforts 
(production stage)
Returns realized
Figure 1: Timeline
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 3 introduces our model of
the founder team formation. Section 4 examines the optimal timing and structure of founder
contracts, and discusses their implications for the team composition, ownership structure, and
performance of the venture. In Section 5 we allow for verifiable but imperfect signals about the
founders’ skills, and derive the optimal contingent contract. In Section 6 we examine the role
of outside investors. Section 7 considers several extensions to our model. Section 8 discusses
some empirical predictions. Section 9 summarizes our key insights and concludes. All proofs
are in the Appendix.
3 The Base Model
There are two economic actors A and B, called founders. Both founders are risk-neutral,
wealth-constrained, and ex-ante symmetric (‘equal to start with’). Over time they may dis-
cover differences with respect to their individual skills (‘unequal later on’), which we elaborate
on later. We assume zero discounting. In the base model we only focus on the founders and
abstract from potential outside investors.3
The founders A and B have the opportunity to start a new venture. The founding process
involves four main stages; see Figure 1. At date 0, the founders decide whether to write a
contract among themselves, refereed to as upfront contracting. The founders then explore their
business opportunity at date 1, and learn whether they possess the skills required to pursue
the opportunity. We call this the development stage. The skills can be observed by the two
founders, but not by third parties. The founders then have to decide whether they want to
pursue the venture jointly as a team, or they want to split in order to exploit the business idea
individually. If the founders have already written a contract at date 0 (upfront contracting), they
3We analyze the role of outside investors in Section 6.
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can renegotiate this contract. Otherwise, they can write a new contract, referred to as delayed
contracting. At date 2, founders work for the venture by exerting private effort. We refer to
this stage as the production stage. Finally, at date 3, the returns to the venture are realized and
divided according to the relevant contract.
Central to our model is that a contract defines firm boundaries that require founders to pursue
their business opportunity as a joint project, eliminating the option of pursuing it alone without
the consent of the other founders. Thus, a contract allocates project-related intellectual property
to a jointly-held company, where it is protected through trade secrets and non-competes. In the
base model we therefore assume that with a founder contract, it is never possible to steal ideas
from a cofounder.4 In Section 7.1 we relax this assumption and consider the possibility of
founders suing each other, even if no formal contract was in place.5
In our model, entrepreneurial value creation starts with the creation (or refinement) of ideas.
Specifically, the two founders jointly develop their business ideas at date 1. In the absence of an
upfront contract, these ideas are appropriable by either founder. However, an upfront contract
can prevent founders from stealing their jointly developed ideas.
The allocation of cash flow rights that results from an upfront or delayed founder contract
matters because it affects the founders’ incentives to create value. After the idea creation stage
comes the stage where the founders implement their ideas, essentially launching a new com-
mercial venture. This requires that founders apply their skills and effort to a set of tasks. We
assume that the success of the new venture requires two critical tasks, that we label x and y. To
perform these tasks effectively, founders need to possess the related skills, which we refer to as
x-skills and y-skills. We do not think of these skills as absolute skills, but as skills pertaining
to the ability to perform a specific task. For example, the tasks may be to develop and sell a
new product. However, to be considered skillful at product development or sales, it would not
be enough that a founder is an engineer or has prior sales experience; they would have to be
able to develop or sell specifically the firm’s new product. At date 0, there is uncertainty about
the skills of each founder. However, at date 1 (development stage), each founder learns his own
skills and those of his cofounder. A founder either has the skill to perform task j = x, y, or
lacks this skill entirely. We denote the skill of founder f = A,B for task j by φfj ∈ {0, 1}. The
task-specific skills of a founder cannot be observed by third parties. In our example, this means
4In practice there may be a grey area where it is difficult to tell whether certain founder ideas or activities
belong to the firm or to the individual. However, the key insight is that there is a big difference between having
established a firm or not. If two individuals co-founded a company, and one of them subsequently tries to build
another venture that is based on similar ideas, the other will have a strong legal case. However, without a founder
contract, the legal case would be considerably weaker.
5Note that a contract among founders is typically written in conjunction with the incorporation of a company
or partnership (Bagley and Dauchy, 2007). Therefore, we can also think of our model as a theory of the timing of
incorporation.
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Scope of Skills Prob. FounderA Prob. FounderB
Generalist ρ1ρ2 ρ1ρ2
Specialist – task x ρ1ρ2 ρ1ρ2
Specialist – task y ρ1ρ2 ρ1ρ2
Ineffective ρ1ρ2 ρ1ρ2
Table 1: Scope of Founder Skills
that at date 0 there is uncertainty whether the founders are good at developing or selling the new
product. At date 1 the two founders learn their true skills, but outsiders still cannot verify these
skills.
Most of the prior literature assumes that ideas can be stolen either always or never. In our
model we derive the possibility of idea stealing from fundamentals, noting that only founders
with generalists skills are in a position to implement an idea on their own. In order to model
such differences between generalists and specialists, we introduce some uncertainty about the
scope of a founder’s skills. In our model each founder can not only be skillful at his main task,
he can also be good at the other task. The engineer, for example, may turn out to be good not
only at developing the specific product, but also at selling it. In the model, the two founders
are symmetric ex-ante, but not identical. Let ρ1 denote the probability that founder A develops
the skill for task x, and ρ2 the probability that he develops the skill for task y, where we define
ρj ≡ (1− ρj), j = 1, 2. We assume that ρ1 > ρ2, which captures the notion that founder A has
a natural talent for task x (i.e., the engineer is more likely to be good at product development
than sales). Accordingly, with probability ρ1ρ2, founder A will develop the relevant skills to
perform both tasks x and y (i.e., φAx = φ
A
y = 1). Founder A is then a generalist (indexed by
g); see Table 1. Founder A could then pursue the business opportunity without a partner. With
probability ρ1ρ2, founder A will only develop the skill for task x (i.e., φAx = 1 and φ
A
y = 0),
and with probability ρ1ρ2, only the skill for task y (i.e., φAx = 0 and φ
A
y = 1). Founder A
is then a specialist (indexed by s), and relies on a partner with complimentary skills. With
probability ρ1ρ2, founder A will not develop any skills (i.e., φAx = φ
A
y = 0). We call a founder
without any skills ineffective (indexed by i) as he is unable to contribute to the new venture. The
probabilities for developing the relevant skills are symmetric for founder B, who has a natural
talent for task y. We denote the expected utility of a type j-founder by Uj·k when his partner is
of type k, with j, k ∈ {g, s, i}.
The productive inputs into the new venture are a combination of skills and effort. Let efj
denote the private effort of founder f = A,B for task j = x, y. The total team effort for task j,
denoted ej , is
ej = φ
A
j e
A
j + φ
B
j e
B
j , (1)
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where φfj ∈ {0, 1}. Implementing effort can only be worthwhile if a founder has the required
skill. If both founders possess the skill, it is irrelevant who implements effort; all that matters
is that skilled effort is applied. A founder’s disutility of effort, denoted c(efx + e
f
y), is strictly
convex in total effort efx + e
f
y , with c(0) = c
′(0) = 0 and limefx+efy→∞ c(·) = ∞. This implies
that only the total effort matters, not the specific allocation across the two tasks x and y.
To model the process of jointly exploiting the business opportunity, we assume that the new
venture is either a success, generating a cash flow pi > 0, or a failure, generating no cash flow
at all.6 The venture will succeed with probability µ(exey), which is increasing and concave
in its argument exey, with limexey→∞ µ(exey) < 1. Thus, the venture cannot succeed unless
both tasks x and y are performed, which in turn requires at least one founder to posses the
corresponding skills.7
The payoff of the new venture – which is either pi > 0 or zero – is verifiable, which in turn
allows the founders to specify a division of surplus in a contract. Due to the binary structure of
the venture’s return, any contract can be expressed as an equity contract, which allocates cash
flow rights to the two founders.8 We denote αj·k as the equity allocated to a type j-founder when
his partner is of type k, where j, k ∈ {g, s, i}. Accordingly, αk·j = 1 − αj·k. We will suppress
the subscript of αj·k for parsimony whenever we do not refer to a specific team constellation. To
derive the equilibrium allocation of equity, we apply the symmetric Nash bargaining solution,
assuming zero outside options for both founders. In addition to specifying the allocation of
equity, a contract also assigns the intellectual property rights of the business idea to the venture.
Thus, if one founder wants to leave the firm, he cannot implement the idea on his own.
Our base model in Section 4 assumes that skills are not verifiable by third parties, and
that founders only use simple non-contingent contracts. Clearly, this assumes that contracts
are incomplete. If skills were verifiable, the optimal contract would directly condition on the
realization of founder skills, and our central trade-off would simply disappear. Empirically it
is implausible to assume that a founder’s task-specific skills are directly observable. However,
there may be other verifiable events (such as the achievement of a milestone) that are correlated
with the realization of founder skills. Our base model deliberately focuses on the case where
founder contracts are not conditioned on anything. However, in Section 5.2 we consider a
more complex environment where contracts can be made contingent on verifiable signals that
are imperfectly correlated with the underlying skills. We then show how the optimal contract
6Note that pi represents the total value obtained by the founders. This may be less than the total value of the
company, namely if the company adds investors or other stakeholders at later stages of the venture.
7In our model the two skills are complements, but the task efforts, ex and ey , are substitutes.
8Note also that the binary payoff structure implies that budget breaking à la Holmström (1982) is not feasible
in our model.
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continuously changes from one extreme with no signals (incomplete contracts) to the other
extreme with perfect signals (complete contracts).
To preserve analytical tractability, our model requires several simplifying assumptions. First,
we limit our analysis to two required tasks, and teams of two partners. Allowing for more
tasks or larger teams would create intractable state spaces.9 Second, skills are binary (i.e.,
φfj ∈ {0, 1}). This implies that a generalist is equally good at a given task as a specialist. On
the one hand, one may argue that generalists are "jack of all trades, master at none", so that they
are less efficient than specialists. On the other hand, one may think of generalists as "super-
stars" who enjoy absolute advantages at all tasks. It is easy to show that the basic trade-off
between upfront and delayed contracting remains intact even if generalists and specialists have
different skill levels. Unfortunately, however, this generalized model does not generate tractable
comparative statics with respect to the skill differentials. Third, we assume that cash flows are
binary, taking on either the value pi or 0. This assumption is standard in financial contract-
ing models, as it helps to avoid the complexities of analyzing general non-linear compensation
structures. Note, however, that in Section 6.1 we consider a simple model extension that ex-
amines a non-linear compensation structure, where founders can get secured debt in addition
to risky equity. Finally, we assume that at date 1 it is impossible to hire additional partners
that have a missing skill. Allowing for late partner additions would considerably complicate
the formal analysis. We conjecture that the main insights of our model continue to hold up as
long as there are some frictions in the process of finding late partners, that give the generalist
an advantage over a specialist in terms of stealing the idea. Frictions may include search costs,
uncertainty about the quality of skills of late partners, not to mention the possibility that late
partners themselves could steal the idea.10
4 The Optimal Timing for Contracting
4.1 Upfront Contracting
Suppose the founders write a contract at date 0 (upfront contracting). The only contractible
outcome is whether the new venture generates a return pi. The contracting space therefore
only concerns the division of surplus as reflected by the equity stake α. Because the skills
of the founders have not yet been developed, and their natural talents are symmetric, the Nash
bargaining solution suggests that they split the equity equally when writing the contract upfront.
9Currently our model has 16 states. With three tasks and three founders, this would already increase to 512
states.
10Along those lines, Hellmann and Perotti (2011) provide a model where ideas can be stolen multiple times.
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FOUNDER  B  
    Generalist    y‐Specialist    x‐Specialist    Ineffective  
  FOUNDER  A 
        
  Generalist      Dream Team    Dream Team    Dream Team    Dud Team  
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Table 2: Constellations under Upfront Contracting
Thus, α∗ = 1/2.11 Given this, and assuming no renegotiation for now, the founders exert private
effort at the production stage which determines the venture’s prospect of success. Given the
individual skills φfx and φ
f
y , f = A,B, both founders simultaneously choose their effort levels
efx and e
f
y to maximize their expected utilities:
max
efx,e
f
y
U f =
1
2
piµ(exey)− c(efx + efy), f = A,B (2)
where ej is the total team effort for task j = x, y as defined by (1). If founder f has the
required skill to perform task j (φfj = 1), his optimal effort e
f∗
j is characterized by the first-
order condition
1
2
piµ′(exey)
(
φAj e
A
j + φ
B
j e
B
j
)
= c′(efx + e
f
y) j ∈ {x, y}. (3)
If founder f does not possess the necessary skill to perform task j, he chooses ef∗j = 0. Clearly,
the effort choice of a founder does not only depend on his own skills, but also on the skills –
and hence the effort choice – of his partner in the Nash equilibrium. Table 2 summarizes all
possible skill formations within the founding team that we discuss below.
If the founding team lacks at least one of the two required skills, then they have to abandon
the idea of developing the new venture. The expected utility for each founder is then U f = 0,
f = A,B.
If both founders are specialists, and their respective skills are complementary to each other
(i.e., one founder has x-skills while the other has y-skills), team production is the only possible
11In Section 5.2 we formally show that randomizing the allocation of equity is not optimal (see Proposition 2
(i)).
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constellation. The optimal effort choice ef∗j of founder f , who has the required skill for task
j ∈ {x, y}, is then characterized by (3) with φfj = 1 and φfl = 0, l ∈ {x, y}, l 6= j. Thus, each
founder focuses on only one of the two tasks, where the respective effort levels are symmetric
(because α∗ = 1/2). We call this specific team formation a dream team as it constitutes the
most efficient outcome, and denote the corresponding expected utility for each founder Udream.
We obtain the same outcome in case one partner is a generalist and the other a specialist.
If both partners turn out to be generalists, they can either stay together and work as a team
(with a dream team as the equilibrium outcome), or agree to split up in order to pursue the
business idea individually. For parsimony we focus on the case where two generalists always
prefer to stay together.12 As will become clear, however, the optimal choice between upfront
and delayed contracting does not depend on whether two generalists stay together. The efforts
of the two generalists are then symmetric (because α∗ = 1/2).
The last possible constellation is where one partner is a generalist and the other is inef-
fective. The generalist then needs to provide all the productive efforts in this partnership to
generate a positive return from the business idea. His optimal effort level ef∗j for task j = x, y is
characterized by (3) with φfj = 1 and φ
k
j = 0, k ∈ {A,B}, k 6= f . We call this team formation
a dud team as the generalist is forced to share equity with an unproductive partner. We define
Ududg as the expected utility of a generalist in a dud team, and U
dud
i as the expected utility of the
ineffective partner.
We also consider whether the partners can benefit from renegotiating the initial equity allo-
cation α∗ = 1/2 after learning their own skills and that of their cofounders. Changing the equity
allocation cannot lead to a Pareto improvement whenever both partners have either symmetric
skills. The contract with α∗ = 1/2 is then renegotiation-proof. It is easy to show that the same
applies to partnerships consisting of a generalist and a specialist.13 The more interesting case
occurs when one partner is a generalist and the other ineffective (dud team). Although the gen-
eralist would prefer to pursue the business idea alone, he cannot buy out the ineffective partner
because of the binding wealth constraint, nor can he exclude him because of the contract written
at date 0. However, the ineffective partner could be better off giving up some of his equity in
order to improve effort incentives for the generalist who is the only productive party. We denote
α̂i·g as the equity share which maximizes the expected utility of an ineffective founder when
his partner is a generalist. Thus, the contract with α∗ = 1/2 is renegotiation-proof whenever
12Technically we assume that half of the monopoly profit pi is still greater than the duopoly profit piD. This
assumption reduces the number of possible outcomes and simplifies our exposition.
13If the specialist gave up some of his equity, he would exert less effort for his task. Because the disutility c(ef )
is convex in total effort ef , the generalist will not raise his own effort to the extent to completely compensate for
his partner’s lower input. As a result, any equity allocation which deviates from α∗ = 1/2 cannot lead to a Pareto
improvement.
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α̂i·g ≥ 1/2 (as the generalist’s preferred equity share α̂g·i = 1). To keep our base model as
concise as possible, we focus in our base model on the case where α̂i·g ≥ 1/2. However, we
show in the Appendix that the basic trade-off between upfront and delayed contracting remains
intact when α̂i·g > 1/2.
Using the expected utility levels for the various team formations (see Table 2), we can
characterize the overall expected utility, denoted EU fu , of founder f = A,B under upfront
contracting:
EU fu =
[
(ρ1ρ2)
2 + (2ρ1ρ2)(ρ1ρ2 + ρ2ρ1) + (ρ1ρ2)
2 + (ρ1ρ2)
2
]
Udream + ρ1ρ2ρ1ρ2U
dud
J ,
where UdudJ = U
dud
g + U
dud
i is the joint utility of a dud team.
Note that for a given type combination (e.g., a generalist and an ineffective founder), each
founder could be either type with equal probability. Hence, the expected utility functions are
inherently symmetric. This symmetry also implies that the socially efficient allocation is the
allocation that maximizes the symmetric expected utility of each individual founder.
The drawback of upfront contracting is that it can result in a dud team: A generalist may
be forced to share equity with an unproductive partner. Delaying the formal contracting until
after the development of critical skills resolves this inefficiency as it allows founders to exclude
unproductive partners. However, as we will show in the next section, delayed contracting comes
with its own problems.
4.2 Delayed Contracting
We now consider the benefits and costs of delaying the formal contracting until after the founders’
respective skills have been developed. Delayed contracting therefore allows the founders to ac-
count for observed skills when writing a formal contract. The possible constellations under
delayed contracting are summarized by Table 3.
The key difference to upfront contracting is that a generalist can now pursue the business
idea alone. Delaying the formal contracting therefore prevents a dud team whenever the partner
of a generalist turns out to be ineffective. While eliminating the risk of sharing equity with
an unproductive partner is an argument for delayed contracting, it introduces a new problem
whenever one partner is a generalist and the other a specialist.
The following two scenarios are conceivable. First, in the absence of a founder contract,
the generalist may leave a specialist, which is inefficient from the perspective of joint value
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Table 3: Constellations under Delayed Contracting
maximization.14 We can think of this scenario as a classic case of one founder stealing the
project or business idea from the other. In the second scenario, the generalist could simply
threaten the specialist to leave the partnership and start his own venture (in which case the
specialist’s payoff is zero) in order to obtain more equity.15
We now characterize the founders’ expected utility levels for those constellations that are
different to those under upfront contracting. Suppose one founder is a generalist and the other
is ineffective. The generalist is then better off pursuing the business opportunity alone; his
expected utility is then denoted U solo. The expected utility of the ineffective founder is zero.
Now consider the constellation where one founder is a generalist and the other a specialist.
The generalist can then either steal the idea and start a solo venture, or offer the specialist to stay
in exchange for more equity. Let α̂g·s denote the equity share which maximizes the generalist’s
expected utility when his partner is a specialist. The generalist prefers to start a solo venture if
α̂g·s = 1. Otherwise, team production still prevails, but the equilibrium equity allocation will
be asymmetric. For our base model we consider the case where α̂g·s = 1, so that the generalist
will always steal the idea to start his own venture. The generalist’s expected utility is then U solo,
while the specialist gets a zero utility. We show in the Appendix that the main trade-off between
upfront and delayed contracting remains intact when α̂g·s < 1.
Using the expected utility levels for the various constellations as summarized by Table 3, we
can characterize the overall expected utility, denoted EU fd , of founder f = A,B under delayed
contracting:
EU fd =
[
ρ1ρ2ρ1ρ2 + ρ
2
1ρ2ρ2 + ρ1ρ
2
2ρ1
]
U solo +
[
(ρ1ρ2)
2 + ρ21ρ
2
2 + ρ
2
2ρ
2
1
]
Udream.
14This is because the expected payoff from the venture is concave in effort, while a founder’s disutility is convex
in total effort (i.e., keeping the total effort constant, the specific effort allocation across the two tasks does not affect
a founder’s disutility of effort).
15Note that side-transfers are not feasible due to the founders’ limited wealth. Thus, the socially efficient out-
come cannot be achieved as the generalist is unable to compensate the specialist for his loss of utility.
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4.3 Upfront vs. Delayed Contracting
We can now contrast the main implications of upfront and delayed contracting on (i) the poten-
tial team compositions, (ii) the ownership structure; and (iii), the performance of the venture.
This comparison will be useful for discussing the optimal timing for the founders to sign a
formal contract, which will be the main focus of this section.
The most efficient outcome is when two skilled partners stay together as a team, and split
the equity of the venture in half. This maximizes total team effort, and hence the expected
performance of the venture. This is the equilibrium outcome whenever the two founders are
both generalists, or both specialists. The issues arise in asymmetric teams where one founder is
a generalist. In a generalist/specialist team, only the protection of an upfront contract guarantees
the most efficient outcome. Delayed contracting, on the other hand, results in the generalist
going alone (holding all of the equity). While such opportunistic behavior is optimal from a
selfish perspective, it results in a lower expected performance of the venture. We contrast this
with the case where one founder is a generalist and the other ineffective (dud team). Without
a contract, the generalist would always leave the ineffective partner, which is efficient from a
selfish as well as social perspective. The expected performance of the solo venture is below
that of a dream team, but still above the performance when sharing equity with an unproductive
partner.
The optimal contracting decision depends on the trade-off between preserving dream teams
with upfront contracting, versus weeding out unproductive partners with delayed contracting.
The next proposition provides a condition for founders to prefer upfront versus delaying con-
tracting. For this we define
Θ =
U solo − UdudJ
2Udream − U solo
Proposition 1
(i) Founders prefer delayed contracting if (ρ1, ρ2) are such that
f(ρ1, ρ2) ≡ ρ1
1− ρ1 +
ρ2
1− ρ2 ≤ Θ
Otherwise they prefer upfront contracting. Delayed contracting is optimal for a larger set
of (ρ1, ρ2) when Θ increases.
(ii) Define ρ̂1(ρ2) such that f(ρ̂1, ρ2) = Θ. Then ρ̂1(ρ2) is decreasing in ρ2. Moreover, the
maximum value of ρ1 for which delayed contracting can be optimal is Θ1+Θ , and for ρ2 the
maximum value is Θ
2+Θ
.
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Figure 2: Optimal Timing for Simple Contracts
Figure 2 illustrates the insights from Proposition 1. Notice that only the equilibria below
the 45-degree line are relevant as we imposed the requirement ρ1 > ρ2. Consider first the
corners of the triangle which represents the set of all potential equilibria. At (0, 0), neither
partner possesses the critical skills, so the founders are forced to give up on the venture. At
(1, 0), each founder has his natural talent skill (i.e., founder A has the x-skill, and founder B
has the y-skill); team production is thus the only possible constellation. Finally, at (1, 1), both
founders are generalists. For all of these extreme cases, it does not matter whether founders
choose upfront or delayed contracting, because neither a dud team nor idea stealing would arise
in equilibrium. For the remainder of the discussion, we focus on the more interesting cases
where ρ1, ρ2 ∈ (0, 1).
We can infer from Figure 2 (and more formally from Proposition 1) that the founders prefer
to write a contract upfront whenever they are sufficiently likely to possess the critical skills
for the venture. The intuition is as follows: For higher values of (ρ1, ρ2), both partners are
concerned about the fact that a specialist is vulnerable to potential idea stealing whenever his
partner turns out to be a generalist. To prevent this from happening, the founders prefer to
write a formal contract upfront at date 0. On the other hand, if both founders are unlikely to
develop any skills, it is optimal for them to delay the formal contracting. Each founder knows
that he and his partner will likely be ineffective, and will thus likely be forced to abandon
the venture. However, if one founder actually turns out to be a generalist, he faces a high
risk of sharing equity with an unproductive partner when contracting upfront. To avoid this
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inefficiency, founders prefer to wait with the formal contracting until after they have observed
their own skills and that of their partners.
The optimal timing for writing a formal founder contract is determined by the trade-off
between the dud team problem (upfront contracting) and the idea stealing problem (delayed
contracting). This trade-off is determined by the parameter Θ as defined in Proposition 1,
where the numerator reflects the inefficiency costs of the dud team, and the denominator the
inefficiency costs of idea stealing. Clearly, Θ increases when the dud team problem becomes
relatively more severe, which results in a higher threshold ρ̂1(ρ2); see Proposition 1. Founders
then delay the formal contracting more often. In contrast, founders contract more often upfront
when the idea stealing problem becomes relatively more severe.
5 Contingent Cash Flow Rights
So far we have considered a simple contracting environment where verifiable information about
the founders’ respective skills are not available. We now extend our model by introducing veri-
fiable but imperfect signals which are correlated with the actual quality of a founder. We think
of these signals as objective performance measures, e.g., whether founders hit milestones such
as developing a prototype or making a first sale by a certain date. However, these milestones are
only imperfect signals of the true underlying skills of a founder. For example, a bad salesman
may be lucky to make his first sale, or a good salesman may be unlucky to miss his first sale.
Making contracts contingent on these signals, even if they are imperfect, will enable founders
to readjust the equity allocation ex-post, in order to better reflect their actual contributions to
the venture. We are particularly interested in (i) how the optimal allocation of cash flow rights
depends on these signals; and (ii), how the availability and precision of signals affects the
founders choice between upfront vs. delayed contracting.
One approach of modeling contingent cash flow rights is to use a mechanism design ap-
proach where players can play subgame perfect implementation games along the lines of Maskin
and Tirole (1999). We note that these revelation mechanisms rely on the existence of sufficiently
large punishments – see Aghion and Holden (2011) for a discussion. Such punishment are not
possible in our model because of risk-neutrality and the founders’ wealth constraints. Moreover,
implementation games are typically not robust to small perturbations of the common knowledge
assumption, as shown by Aghion et al. (2012).
We use an alternative approach of modeling contingent contracts that is akin to Aghion
and Bolton (1992). Specifically we assume that there exist some verifiable signals that are im-
perfectly correlated with the underlying states of nature. The parties can make the contract
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contingent on these verifiable signals. However, contingent cash flow rights remain imper-
fect because the signals do not perfectly match the underlying state. These contingent cash
flow rights closely resemble the contractual structures used by founder teams that make use
of founder vesting schedules. Wasserman (2012, chapter 6) describes how founders use mile-
stones and vesting schedules to dynamically adjust founder equity stakes over time. In a related
vein, Kaplan and Strömberg (2004) also note that contingent allocations of cash flow rights are
common in venture capital contracts.
5.1 Signals, Milestones and Vesting
We begin by defining the structure of signals and contingent cash flow rights. Suppose that
after the development stage, there exists an independent and verifiable signal Γf ∈ {Γ+f ,Γ−f }
for founder f = A,B that is an imperfect indicator of the presence or absence of skills (which
are still only observable by the founders themselves). If founder f has at least one task-specific
skill (φfx + φ
f
y > 0), then with probability η ≥ 1/2 the signal is positive (Γf = Γ+f ); and
with probability 1 − η, the signal is negative (Γf = Γ−f ). Likewise, if founder f is ineffective
(φfx + φ
f
y = 0), then with probability η the signal is negative (Γf = Γ
−
f ); and with probability
1−η, the signal is positive (Γf = Γ+f ). Thus, the signals may expose unproductive partners, but
they do not reveal the specific skills of founders.16 For η = 1/2, the signals are uninformative;
and for η = 1, the signals are always correct. We denote the set of the signals for both founders
Γ = {ΓA,ΓB}. A natural interpretation of the signals is that they represent the achievement
of milestones. If Γf = Γ+f , then founder f = A,B has reached his individual milestone
(e.g. developed a working prototype, acquired first customer, etc.). Our model recognizes that
achieving such a milestone is only an imperfect indicator of the actual skills of a founder.
The signals can be used to improve the efficiency of upfront contracting. For instance, if
only one founder, say founder A, obtains a positive signal (ΓA = Γ+A), then the contract may
specify a new allocation of equity, that we denote by α∗(Γ+A,Γ
−
B) ≥ 1/2. Any asymmetric
equity allocation can then be interpreted as performance-based vesting. Initially, when writing
a contract at date 0, each founder gets the same amount of shares. However, some (or all) shares
are subject to vesting: They are withheld until founders have reached their respective milestones
(i.e., Γf = Γ+f , f ∈ {A,B}).17
16We focus on one very intuitive signal structure, but clearly there could be other signal structures too. For
instance, a signal could identify a generalist, but not distinguish between specialists and unproductive partners.
Or a signal could identify the presence of only one of the two skills. While a model with such alternative signal
structures would generate different threshold values, the basic principle of using the signal to write a contingent
contract remains valid for any informative signal.
17To see this more formally, let λuf be the number of shares given upfront to founder f , and let λ
m
f be the number
of shares given upon achievement of the milestone. With symmetric founders we have λjA = λ
j
B ≡ λj , j = u,m.
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Finally we denote the updated skill probabilities for a founder by ρ+1 and ρ
+
2 in case his
signal is positive (Γf = Γ+f ), and by ρ
−
1 and ρ
−
2 in case his signal is negative (Γf = Γ
+
f ). These
updated skill probabilities are derived in the Appendix (see Proof of Proposition 2).
5.2 Optimal Contingent Cash Flow Rights
We first identify the structure of the optimal contingent contract, assuming that the founders
choose to contract upfront. This is an important stepping stone for our analysis in Section
5.3, which examines the optimal contracting choice of the founders, including the decision to
contract upfront or later.
We start by deriving the optimal contingent contract for the more interesting case where
one founder has a positive signal while his partner has as negative signal (Γ = {Γ+,Γ−}).
As explained earlier, we can interpret any asymmetric equity allocation α∗(Γ+,Γ−) 6= 1/2 as
performance-based vesting, where only the founder with the positive signal receives his vested
shares. However, depending on the founders’ respective skills, the stipulated equity alloca-
tion α∗(Γ+,Γ−) may not be Pareto-efficient. We therefore allow for renegotiation, using Nash
bargaining.
The key advantage of including a vesting clause in the founder agreement is the mitigation
of the dud team problem: If the signal about an ineffective partner’s skills is indeed negative
(Γf = Γ−f ), then the generalist obtains more equity, which is efficient from a joint perspec-
tive. However, including a vesting clause in the contract can also impair the efficiency of dream
teams. For instance, performance-based vesting could result in a generalist obtaining the major-
ity of equity, which is individually optimal but inefficient from a joint perspective. The trade-off
between these two effects depends to a large extent on the quality of signals, i.e., the ability of
signals to distinguish dream teams from dud teams.
The next proposition specifies the optimal contingent contract for asymmetric signals.
Proposition 2 Suppose the signals are asymmetric. Then, there exists a threshold signal preci-
sion η < 1 such that the optimal vesting schedule α∗(η) at date 0 is as follows:
(i) If η = 1/2, no shares are vested: α∗(1/2) = 1/2.
If both founders achieved their milestones, they each obtain the equity share α = (λu+λm)/(2λu+2λm) = 1/2;
if they both failed to achieve their milestones, they each obtain the equity share α = λu/(2λu) = 1/2. The vested
shares, 2λm, remain the property of the venture, and are therefore proportionally owned by both partners. However,
if, for example, founder A achieved his milestone but founder B did not, then α = (λu + λm)/(2λu + λm) =
α∗(Γ+,Γ−). For λu > λm = 0 we obtain α∗(Γ+,Γ−) = 1/2; and for λm > λu = 0 we obtain α∗(Γ+,Γ−) = 1.
Moreover, we can obtain any intermediate value α∗(Γ+,Γ−) ∈ (1/2, 1) by setting the ratio of vested shares,
λm/λu, to λm/λu = (1− α∗)/(2α∗ − 1). This shows that our model of allocating equity based on the outcomes
of the two signals naturally corresponds to contracts that include a vesting clause based on performance milestones.
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(ii) If 1/2 < η ≤ η, some shares are vested: α∗(η) ∈ (1/2, 1), where α∗(η) is increasing in
η.
(iii) If η > η, all shares are vested: α∗(η) = 1.
The precision of the signals – as reflected by η – is a critical factor for the founders’ vesting
decision. Whenever the signals do not contain any information (η = 1/2), the founders prefer
to use a simple contract. Using uninformative signals would do more harm than good, namely
by compromising the efficiency of dream teams. On the other hand, if the signals about the
founders’ skills contain some information (η > 1/2), vesting part of the shares at date 0 is
optimal; and more shares are vested the more informative the signals. The optimal vesting
schedule then trades-off the benefit of improving the efficiency of dud teams and the cost of
asymmetric equity allocations in teams where both founders are skilled.
Proposition 2 provides another interesting insight: If the signals are sufficiently precise
(η > η), all shares are vested at date 0. The founder with the positive signal is then entitled to the
entire equity of the venture.18 Both founders, however, can always overturn Pareto-inefficient
equity allocations; for example, a specialist would never want to keep the entire equity when
his partner has the complementary skill.
In the Appendix we also derive the optimal contingent contract for two symmetric signals.
The main insight is that if both signals are negative, then it is optimal to keep (break up) the
firm whenever the updated beliefs (ρ−1 , ρ
−
2 ) are sufficiently high (low).
5.3 Contingent Upfront vs. Delayed Contracting
We have shown in the previous section that verifiable signals about skills allow founders to
write more sophisticated contracts by including a vesting clause in the founder agreement. Ac-
counting for such contingent upfront contracts, it remains to identify the optimal contracting
time for both founders.
Proposition 3 Suppose η > 1/2.
(i) There exists a threshold ρ̂ s1 (ρ2, η) such that founders only delay the contracting if ρ1 <
ρ̂ s1 (ρ2, η). Otherwise, they always contract upfront, using performance-based vesting.
(ii) The threshold ρ̂ s1 (ρ2, η) is decreasing in η, with ρ̂
s
1 (ρ2, 1/2) = ρ̂1(ρ2).
18This result may seem extreme, so it is interesting to note that such contracts do exist. Wasserman (2011) reports
the case of Ockham Technologies, where the founder vesting schedule includes the possibility that founders lose
all of their shares if certain conditions apply.
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Whenever both founders are sufficiently likely to develop some skills (ρ1 ≥ ρ̂ s1 (ρ2, η)), they
contract upfront at date 0. Provided signals are informative (η > 1/2), they include a vesting
clause in the contract. The optimal vesting schedule then balances the benefit of curbing the
dud team problem, and the cost of inducing an asymmetric equity allocation in dream teams.
On the other hand, delayed contracting remains the optimal choice whenever both founders are
sufficiently unlikely to possess any skills (ρ1 < ρ̂ s1 (ρ2, η)). Delayed contracting then eliminates
the risk of sharing equity with an unproductive partner.
The precision of the signals – as reflected by η – also affects the founders’ contracting
choice. More informative signals make detrimental asymmetric equity allocations in dream
teams less likely, and at the same time, improve the efficiency of equity allocations in dud
teams. This in turn makes upfront contracting with performance-based vesting more attractive
to founders that are likely to possess some skills. More informative signals therefore lead to
more contingent cash flow rights at date 0. Formally this means dρ̂ s1 (ρ2, η)/dη < 0.
If the signals about skills are perfectly precise (η = 1), founders always contract upfront
(i.e., limη→1 ρ̂ s1 (ρ2, η) = 0). Moreover, we know from Proposition 2 that full vesting is then
optimal (α∗(1) = 1). This is intuitive as perfectly precise signals fully separate productive
from unproductive partners. Full vesting then ensures that a generalist in a dud team receives
the entire equity of the venture. The only potential downside of upfront contracting, namely the
dud team problem, is then completely eliminated, while delayed contracting is still afflicted with
the idea stealing problem. It is therefore always optimal to contract upfront with full vesting
whenever available signals about the founders’ skills are perfectly precise.
6 The Role of Outside Investors
Our model clearly depends on a binding wealth constraint. If founders held sufficient personal
wealth outside the business, then they could resolve all inefficiencies. Under upfront contract-
ing, a generalist could buy out an inefficient partner to obtain all of the founder equity. Under
delayed contracting, a specialist could “buy in” himself with a generalist, in order to prevent
inefficient idea stealing. While theoretically elegant, these solutions are of limited practical
relevance, given that founders typically do not have enough personal wealth to buy out their
partners, or buy their way back into the firm.
In this section we consider the role of outside investors under two alternative scenarios. We
first consider a model with assets that hold some liquidation value, and derive a role for secured
debt. We then ask whether beyond such secured lending, investors are also willing to finance
founder buy-outs or buy-ins with unsecured risky securities.
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6.1 Secured Funding
If founders have no outside wealth, an interesting question is whether and how they can use any
wealth inside the firm to make transfers payments (relating to buy-outs or buy-ins). To examine
this we add a positive liquidation value to our base model. We first show how this relaxes the
founders’ binding wealth constraints, and then explain how founders can use simple financial
securities to structure optimal contracts.
Let piH be the return of a successful venture, and piL > 0 be the return in case of a failure,
with piH > piL > 0. The payoff piL represents the liquidation value of the firm. We define
pi ≡ piH −piL as the incremental return in case the venture succeeds. With a positive liquidation
value it is natural to talk about downside returns piL that are perfectly safe, and additional upside
returns pi that are uncertain. The optimal security design for the founders consists of some
allocation of the cash flows piH and piL. W.l.o.g. we can describe the optimal security structure
as a combination of secured debt for allocating the downside returns piL, and risky equity for
allocating the additional cash flows pi on the upside. We denote A’s secured debt claim by dA,
and B’s debt claim by dB satisfying dA + dB = piL. A’s expected utility becomes
EUA = µ(exey) [dA + αpi] + (1− µ(exey))dA − c(eAx + eAy ).
Founder B’s expected utility is symmetric. We immediately note that EUA is linear in dA, and
EUB is linear in dB(= piL − dA). It follows that the liquidation value piL acts as transferable
utility.
One minor complication concerns the appropriability of the liquidation value. If the liqui-
dation value is directly tied to implementing the idea, then a generalist who appropriates the
idea also captures the entire liquidation value. However, if the liquidation value is tied to some
other assets that are owned by the respective founders, then a generalist can only appropriate
the idea and his portion of the assets, but not his partner’s portion. We allow for a flexible model
specification where δ ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of appropriability. For δ = 0 none of the
liquidation value is appropriable, for δ = 1 all of it is appropriable.
The following proposition explains how founders optimally allocate the cash flow rights in
the presence of a positive liquidation value.
Proposition 4
(i) Under upfront contracting, the optimal ex-ante contract is always symmetric. Ex-post a
generalist (A) and an ineffective partner always renegotiate the financial structure. There
exists a threshold piL > 0, such that the renegotiated contract entails
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− α∗ = 1 and d∗B > d∗A ≥ 0 for piL ≥ piL
− 1/2 < α∗ < 1 and d∗B = piL > d∗A = 0 for piL < piL.
(ii) Under delayed contracting the optimal ex-ante contract is always symmetric if the part-
ners have symmetric skills. With a generalist (A) and a specialist (B), there exists a
threshold ̂̂piL, such that the optimal contract entails
− α∗ = 1 and d∗A = piL > d∗B = 0 for δ = 1
− α∗ ∈ (1/2, 1) and d∗A = piL > d∗B = 0, for piL < ̂̂piL and δ < 1
− α∗ = 1/2 and piL ≥ d∗A > 0, d∗B ≥ 0 for piL ≥ ̂̂piL and δ < 1
Because our partners are ex-ante symmetric, the optimal upfront contract is always symmet-
ric.19 However, at the ex-post stage (date 1) founders may renegotiate towards an asymmetric
financial structure. Consider upfront contracting. At date 1, a generalist would like to offer
an ineffective partner some debt in exchange for equity. This is because equity increases the
generalist’s effort incentives, thereby reducing the inefficiencies of the dud team. If there is a
lot of liquidation value (piL > piL), the generalist buys out all the equity (α∗ = 1), and the dud
problem is fully solved. For a lower liquidation value (i.e., piL < piL), the generalist gives up
the entire liquidation value (d∗A = 0) to buy as much as equity as possible. Since α
∗ < 1, the
dud problem is not fully resolved.
Under delayed contracting we find again that all symmetric constellations have symmetric
security structures. The interesting case concerns a generalist/specialist team.20 If the entire
liquidation value is appropriable, the generalist simply retains all of the value on the upside and
on the downside. However, if not all of it is appropriable, the specialist can trade his claim
on the downside against some upside equity. For a high liquidation value (i.e., piL ≥ ̂̂piL), the
specialist buys back exactly half of the equity (α∗ = 1/2). In this case the joint surplus is
maximized and the idea stealing problem is fully eliminated. For a lower liquidation value (i.e.,
piL < ̂̂piL), the specialist buys back as much equity as possible. However, his debt claim is
insufficient to get half of the equity, so that α∗ > 1/2. In this case the inefficiency is not fully
resolved.21
19If we use the above security structure with debt and equity, the optimal debt claims are given by d∗A = d
∗
B =
piL/2 and the equity is split 50-50. An equivalent security structure is to simply give each founder a symmetric
50% equity claim over the entire firm value.
20Here we focus on the case where the generalist wants to steal the idea (α̂g·s = 1). In the Appendix we show
that very similar results obtain for the case where idea stealing is only threatened (α̂g·s < 1).
21Note that ̂̂piL is an increasing function of δ, since for higher values of δ the specialist has a lower downside
claim to trade with.
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Our discussion so far assumes that the secured debt claims dA and dB are held by the founder
themselves. However, an equivalent arrangement would be that the secured debt claim is held
by an outside investor (e.g., a bank). In the case of a buy-out, for example, this might allow
an ineffective founder to completely sever all ties with the company, receiving cash in return to
handing over the secured debt claim.
6.2 Unsecured Funding
The discussion above shows that if the firm has assets with liquidation value, these can be used
for transfer payments through the use of secured debt instruments. This assumes that the firm
has assets with a liquidation value piL, and that no other investor has a prior claim on that liqui-
dation value. In practice, start-ups are rarely born with assets that have a significant liquidation
value. Moreover, the assets that they acquire over time are typically purchased with secured
debt, so that they cannot be used for the transfer payments described in Proposition 4. We now
ask whether beyond any secured lending, founders can raise funding for transfer payments by
issuing risky securities. Obviously start-ups typically already raise unsecured funding for in-
vestment purposes. Therefore the question is whether they can also raise additional unsecured
funding for structuring buy-outs or buy-ins.
To address this, we consider a model extension where the founders require capital in order
to launch the venture. To simplify the exposition we return to the base model with piL = 0,
although nothing depends on this simplification. In the absence of a safe asset, founders can
only issue risky claims to outside investors. Throughout we assume that outside investors are
passive (i.e., they do not impact returns), and that financial markets are perfectly competitive.22
The main question is whether it is optimal for founders to raise more capital than required
for launching the venture. Let I be the total amount of funding raised, K the amount of cap-
ital needed to launch the venture, and T (= K − I) the amount of additional capital raised,
which could be used by the founders to mitigate, or even to eliminate, the dud problem (early
contracting) or the idea stealing problem (delayed contracting).
We immediately state the main result of this section.
Proposition 5 It is optimal for the founders to only raise the minimal amount I = K from
outside investors.
22Allowing for active investors who can add value to the venture would generate a distinct and separate reason
for outside investors to acquire equity in the company. However, analyzing the role of active investors is beyond
the scope of this paper. Hellmann (2006) provides a detailed analysis of optimal contracts for active value-adding
investors.
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At first glance the insight from Proposition 5 is surprising as one might have expected that
raising external capital in excess of K helps founders to resolve the inefficiencies imposed by
their binding wealth constraints. The key intuition why outside investors cannot ameliorate this
problem is that they have to take a risky position on the cash flows of the company. This creates
an incentive distortion that is at least as harmful as the inefficiency that founders try to address.
Raising more than the required amount K is therefore never optimal.
To see why, note that founders could be seeking additional outside funding T at two distinct
points in time: ex-ante (date 0) or ex-post (date 1). Consider first the case of ex-ante fund-
raising under upfront contracting. Suppose the two founders raise an additional amount T > 0
from an outside investor at date 0. In our simple binary specification there are only two states
(pi and 0), so investors’ claims on the cash flows pi can be equally interpreted as equity or risky
debt- for simplicity we refer to it as equity. We denote the equity share that founders need to
offer investors in order to raise capital I by γ(I). In a competitive market γ(I) satisfies
[
χ1µ
dream(ex(γ)ey(γ)) + χ2µ
dud(ex(γ)ey(γ))
]
γpi = I,
where χ1 = (ρ1ρ2)2 + (2ρ1ρ2)(ρ1ρ2 + ρ2ρ1) + (ρ1ρ2)2 + (ρ1ρ2)2 and χ2 = ρ1ρ2ρ1ρ2 are the
probabilities of a dream team and a dud team, respectively, and where µdream (µdud) denotes
the equilibrium success probability in case of a dream (dud) team. Symmetry implies that each
founder gets T/2 of the additional funds, as well as an equity share (1 − γ)/2. The expected
utility of a founder under upfront contracting is then given by
EU fu (γ(I), T ) = χ1U
dream(γ(I), T ) + χ2U
dud
J (γ(I), T ). (4)
We note from (4) that raising the extra amount T affects not only dud teams (UdudJ ), but also
dream teams (Udream). The joint surplus of dream teams is maximized when each productive
founder gets exactly half of the venture’s equity. Giving up the additionally required equity
share γ(K + T ) − γ(K) for an investor in exchange for the excess capital T further weakens
the founders’ effort incentives, and thus further compromises their joint payoff. Dream teams
are therefore better off just raising the required amount K.23
Next we ask whether the dud team problem can be mitigated by raising additional capital
T > 0. Each founder now has an equity stake of (1 − γ(K + T ))/2 instead of (1 − γ(K))/2.
This weakens the generalist’s effort incentives, but the generalist can now use his part of the
additional funding, namely T/2, to buy equity from the ineffective partner. In the Appendix we
23In fact, the founders of a dream team would want to use the excess capital to buy back shares from the outside
investor, thus effectively reversing the additional fundraising of T .
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show that the best the generalist can do – namely if he can make a take-it or leave-it offer that
leaves the ineffective partner indifferent between accepting and refusing – is to bring his equity
stake from (1− γ(K + T ))/2 back to (1− γ(K))/2. In other words, the best the generalist can
hope for by raising T > 0 brings him back to what he would have already gotten with T = 0.
Therefore, raising additional outside capital cannot increase the generalist’s equilibrium equity
share. Overall we find that there are no gains for dud teams to raising more than the required
amount K from outside investors.
For delayed contracting, we ask if a specialist can use external capital to retain a generalist.
The problem is again that raising additional outside capital (T > 0) requires giving up even
more equity to outside investors. In the Appendix we show that for any allocation where the
investor holds the equity γ(K+T ), there is a better allocation where the founders use whatever
additional capital was raised to buy back equity, up to the point where investor are back to
holding the minimum equity γ(K). Overall we conclude that the provision of outside funding
does not help to solve the fundamental problem of binding wealth constraints.24
7 Model Extensions
7.1 Implied Partnerships
Courts sometimes assume the existence of a partnership among founders, even when no formal
contract was signed. In the introduction we already mentioned the example of Mark Zuckerberg
and the Winklevoss twins. The courts’ reasoning for assuming implied partnerships is largely
based on protecting naïve founders who may not understand the need for formal contracting,
and may be taken advantage of by savvier cofounders. The extent to which founders are naïve
or savvy is an empirical question not to be settled here. What we examine here is how the
protection of implied partnerships affects the contracting decisions of ’non-naïve’ founders that
satisfy the standard economic assumption of being rational and understanding the game that is
being played.
To formally model this we return to our base model, but now allow for the possibility of
lawsuits concerning implied partnerships. Consider delayed contracting, and suppose that a
founder with generalist skills pursues the business opportunity alone, but subsequently gets
sued by his former partner, who is either a specialist or ineffective. We assume that lawsuits
for implied partnerships take place after the production stage, are costless, and succeed with
24In the appendix we also show that for any given level of investment I , investors cannot change the equity
allocation amongst founders to improve joint efficiency.
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probability λ ∈ (0, 1).25 If the lawsuit is successful, the court grants the former partner an
equity share θ ∈ (0, 1). The expected equity share for the solo founder is therefore given by
λ(1− θ) + (1− λ)1 = 1− λθ.
For parsimony, we define Λ ≡ λθ. We can think of Λ as the shadow equity value for an
ineffective founder that could sue his former partner.
The next proposition points out how potential lawsuits affect the founders’ contracting de-
cision.
Proposition 6 The higher Λ, the greater the range where upfront contracting is optimal (i.e.,
dρ̂1(ρ2,Λ)/dΛ < 0, with ρ̂1(ρ2, 0) = ρ̂1(ρ2)).
This proposition suggests that the legal protection of implied partnerships can lead to unin-
tended effects that seem opposite to the original intent. In our model such protection encourages
founders to contract upfront. This is because the dud team problem is no longer unique to up-
front contracting, but also affects delayed contracting. Rational founders may want to delay
contracting, yet implied partnership protection makes this option less attractive. Thus, when
founders are rational and forward looking, enforcing implied partnerships pushes founders into
early contracting, and may reduce the founders utilities.26
7.2 Specific Investments
In our base model we treat the development of skills as exogenous. An interesting question is
how the contracting decision would affect founders’ incentives to invest in task-specific skills.
One intuitive conjecture may be that contracts provide commitment, giving the founders better
protection from idea stealing, and thus encouraging specific investments. Below we show the
opposite: lack of contractual commitment may actually generate stronger incentives for skill de-
velopment, since founders realize that developing task-specific skills is necessary to be included
in the team.
Consider the base model without verifiable signals, We now endogenize the probability ρf1
for founder f = A,B to develop his main skill. For tractability we keep ρ2 constant. We assume
25Allowing for positive costs will not change the qualitative nature of our results.
26One theoretical solution to this problem is that founders write a contract about the non-existence of a partner-
ship. Consider a pair of founders who would have liked to delay the contracting if there were no lawsuits, but now
prefer upfront contracting in the presence of lawsuits. Conceivably they could write an explicit ’non-partnership’
agreement, stating that they have no contractual commitments, and that they indemnify each other from possible
lawsuits. In practice, however, it is unclear whether courts would be willing to enforce such ’non-partnership’
agreements. In a world with asymmetric information, founders may also hesitate to grant such indemnifications.
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that ρf1 = ρ0 +ψs
f , where ρ0 (≥ ρ2) is a constant minimum probability of being skillful, and sf
is private effort leading to a further development of the main skill. The parameter ψ ∈ [0, ψmax]
reflects the productivity of effort, where ψmax ensures that ρf1 ≤ 1. The skill development cost
c(sf ) is increasing and convex in sf , with c(0) = c′(0) = 0.
Let zfu denote the marginal effort incentives for founder f = A,B to invest in his main
skill under upfront contracting, and zfd his marginal incentives under delayed contracting, with
∆zA ≡ zfu − zfd . In the Appendix we show that delayed contracting provides founder A with
stronger incentives to develop his main skills if ∆zA > 0 where
∆zA = ρ2[ρ
B
1 ρ2(U
dream − U steals ) + ρB1 ρ2(U stealg − Udream)]
ρ2
[
ρB1 ρ2(U
steal
g − Udream) + ρB1 ρ2(U solo − Udwg )
]
+ρ2
[
ρB1 ρ2(U
steal
s − (Udream − Udwi ))
]
.
The case for founder B is symmetric.
From ∆zA it becomes clear that there are five different incentive effects. The first four
effects are all positive, suggesting that incentives are stronger under delayed contracting. They
all pertain to the case where founder A has the secondary skill (as reflected by ρ2). The four
effects only differ in the skills that founder B has. For the first effect, B is a generalist (ρB1 ρ2).
Under upfront contracting there are no incentives to acquire further skills, but under delayed
contracting possessing both skills guarantees A to be part of a dream team (Udream) rather than
B being in a position to steal the business idea (leaving A with U steals ). For the second and third
effect B is a specialist, so A’s incentive under delayed contracting is to become a generalist
who can steal the idea (U stealg − Udream). For the fourth effect, B is ineffective. Becoming a
generalist under delayed contracting gives A the chance to own the entire venture (U solo), rather
than having to share it with a deadweight partner (Udwg ). The fifth effect is in general ambiguous,
and always negative when idea stealing is realized so that U steals = 0. This effect pertains to
the case where A does not have the secondary skill (as reflected by ρ2), and B is a generalist.
In this case delayed contracting may lead to lower incentives than upfront contracting. This
is because the benefit of acquiring skills under delayed contracting are now small (and zero
when idea stealing occurs, i.e., U steals = 0), given that B is a generalist who can steal the idea.
By contrast, the benefit of acquiring skills under upfront contracting is moving from being an
ineffective partner (Udwi ) to being a fully contributing member of a dream team (U
dream).
Intuitively, the first four effects dominate the fifth for a wide range of parameters. However,
there is a small range of parameters where the fifth effect can dominate. In the Appendix we
state Lemma 1 that contains the formal conditions for this to be true.
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We can now state the key result for this section:
Proposition 7 Under the conditions of Lemma 1, delayed contracting provides greater incen-
tives to invest in specific skills.
So far we considered the base model without the verifiable signals. Allowing for verifiable
signals as in Section 5 may affect the results. It is easy to see that for η sufficiently close to 1/2,
the basic intuition of Proposition 7 continues to hold. However, for sufficiently precise signals
and ρ1 being sufficiently high and ρ2 being sufficiently low (ρ1 ≥ ρ̂1 and ρ2 < ρ̂2), incentives
to invest in specific skills are greater under upfront contracting.27 The key intuition is that pre-
cise signals help to identify ineffective founders. This solves the incentive problem of upfront
contracting, so that an ineffective founder can no longer free-ride alongside a generalist partner.
Founders therefore have good incentives to invest in skills, even under upfront contracting.
One may also ask whether upfront or delayed contracting provides different incentives for
idea generation. Suppose that founders can determine the (concave) probability θ(eAθ , e
B
θ ) of
a successful idea development by exerting effort efθ , f = A,B, at the convex private cost
c(efθ ). Under upfront contracting, founder f = A,B chooses development effort e
f
θ to maximize
θ(eAθ , e
B
θ )EU
f
u − c(efθ ), where EU fu is the founder’s expected utility under upfront contracting
given a fully developed idea; see Section 4.1. Likewise, founder f = A,B chooses development
effort efθ under delayed contracting to maximize θ(e
A
θ , e
B
θ )EU
f
d − c(efθ ), where EU fd is his
expected utility under delayed contracting in case the idea is fully developed; see Section 4.2.
We can immediately see that upfront contracting provides greater incentives to develop the idea
whenever EU fu > EU
f
d . It is then also optimal for the founders to contract upfront instead of
delaying the formal contracting (see Proposition 1). Thus, the founders’ optimal contracting
decision also maximizes incentives for developing the business idea for their venture.
8 Empirical Implications
Our theory of contracting among founders generates a number of interesting empirical predic-
tions. First, the timing of contracting should depend on how likely critical skills are present
in the founder team, with a lower likelihood predicting greater delays. Empirically this can
be measured both in terms of market characteristics (e.g., required tasks are more predictable
in established than in new markets), and in terms of team characteristics (e.g., founders with
a common prior history should find it easier to assess their respective skills). One empirical
27Formally, the condition Ω > 0 from Lemma 1 (see Appendix) is always violated for sufficiently precise
signals, as Udwi → 0 as η → 1.
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challenge is to observe the partners that were excluded from the venture (especially if courts
are sympathetic to the implied partnership argument). Interestingly, the empirical prediction
that upfront contracting is associated with likely skilled founders remains true even if we only
observe a subset of the teams that delayed contracting.
Our model makes some predictions about the expected success of new ventures. Founder
teams that delay contracting should have a higher performance than teams that contract upfront,
because the latter include outright failures (critical skills are not present), and teams with in-
effective partners. Conditional on skills, however, upfront-contract teams either have the same
expected performance as delayed-contract teams (generalist/generalist and specialist/specialist
combinations), or they have a higher expected performance (for a generalist/specialist constella-
tion, upfront contracting is efficient, whereas the generalist gets an inefficiently large ownership
share with delayed contracting).28
Our model also makes interesting predictions about the use of founder vesting clauses. Vest-
ing naturally depends on how well milestones reflect the presence of critical skills. Our model
predicts that more accurate signals do not only lead to more founder shares being subject to vest-
ing, but also result in more upfront contracting. Vesting based on more accurate signals should
also have a positive effect on the expected performance of a venture as it leads to equity allo-
cations that better reflect the relative importance of individual founders (generalist/ineffective
case).
Finally, our model makes some interesting predictions concerning financial transactions
among founders, such as buy-ins and buy-outs. Specifically it predicts that such transactions
can be readily made by restructuring founder debt claims, or by issuing secured debt claims to
outside investors. However, the model predicts that such transactions would not be financed
with the issuance of risky equity claims to outside investors.
9 Conclusion
In this paper we examine contractual choices concerning the formation of founder teams. We
develop a model where partners face uncertainty about critical skills that are specific to their
business opportunity, and consider whether committing upfront or waiting for the resolution
of the uncertainty is optimal. Upfront contracting prevents inefficient idea stealing, but may
also lead to teams with unproductive partners. The model shows that delayed contracting is
optimal whenever founders are sufficiently likely to lack the critical skills. We also show that
contingent contracts with a vesting of shares make upfront contracting more attractive; however,
28Tamvada and Shrivastava (2011), using the Kauffman firm survey, provide evidence supporting this prediction.
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the effectiveness of these contracts depends on how well milestones correlate with the presence
of individual skills. Finally we show that courts protecting founders without formal contracts
create counter-intuitive incentives: Founders may contract upfront even though they would have
preferred to wait.
This paper takes a first step towards examining the complex dynamics of founder contracts,
which are a key determinant for the ownership of corporations. Our model focuses on ex-
ante symmetric founders. An interesting next step would be to examine asymmetric partner
combinations. The main uncertainty in this paper concerns founder skills, leaving out other
potential sources of uncertainty, such as concerning risk-taking behaviors, strategic directions,
or interpersonal conflicts. We leave these and other related questions to future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
Founder f = A,B prefers delayed contracting if EU fu ≤ EU fd , which is equivalent to
[ρ1ρ2 + ρ1ρ2]
[
2Udream − U solo] ≤ ρ1ρ2 [U solo − UdudJ ] . (5)
Using Θ ≡ [U solo − UdudJ ] / [2Udream − U solo] we can write this condition as
f(ρ1, ρ2) ≡ ρ1
1− ρ1 +
ρ2
1− ρ2 ≤ Θ. (6)
Note that the left-hand side of (6) is increasing in both ρ1 and ρ2. Thus, the condition is satisfied
for a larger set of (ρ1, ρ2) when Θ increases. Now define ρ̂1(ρ2) such that f(ρ̂1, ρ2) = Θ.
Implicitly differentiating ρ̂1 w.r.t. ρ2 yields
dρ̂1
dρ2
=
d
dρ2
[
ρ2
1−ρ2
]
d
dρ1
[
ρ1
1−ρ1
] = −1 < 0.
Because dρ̂1/dρ2 < 0, the highest value of ρ1 where (6) still holds satisfies f(ρ1, 0) = ρ1/(1−
ρ1) = Θ, which is equivalent to ρ1 = Θ/(1+Θ). Moreover, because dρ̂1/dρ2 < 0 and ρ1 > ρ2,
the highest value of ρ2 where (6) still holds satisfies f(ρ2, ρ2) = 2ρ2/(1 − ρ2) = Θ, which is
equivalent to ρ2 = Θ/(2 + Θ). 2
Renegotiation and Asymmetric Equity Shares.
For our base model we focused on the scenario where renegotiation in a dud team (upfront
contracting) as well as in a generalist-specialist team (delayed contracting) does not improve
Pareto efficiency. We now show that the main trade-off between upfront and delayed contracting
remains intact when allowing for mutually beneficial renegotiation.
Consider first dud teams under upfront contracting. The ineffective partner may then be
willing to relinquish some of his equity in order to strengthen the generalist’s effort incentives,
and thus to enhance the expected payoff from the venture. This is the case whenever α̂i·g < 1/2.
Consider for example the following specification: µ(exey) = (exey)γ with 0 < γ < 1, and
c(ekx + e
k
y) = (e
k
x + e
k
y)
2/2. For this specification one can show that α̂i·g = 1 − γ.29 Thus,
renegotiation in a dud team is Pareto improving whenever 1/2 < γ < 1. We define α∗g·i as the
Nash bargaining outcome for the generalist when renegotiating the equity allocation with the
29The proof is available from the authors upon request.
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ineffective partner, with 1 − α̂i·g < α∗g·i < 1. The expected joint utility of a dud team is then
given by
UdudJ−R =
 U
dud
g (α
∗
g·i) + U
dud
i (1− α∗g·i) if α̂i·g < 1/2
Ududg (1/2) + U
dud
i (1/2) if α̂i·g ≥ 1/2.
Now consider the generalist-specialist team under delayed contracting. Instead of stealing
the idea (as considered in the base model), the generalist could also simply threaten the special-
ist to leave the partnership in order to obtain more equity. This scenario can only arise if the
utility frontier is backward-bending so that α̂g·s < 1. Consider again the simple specification
with µ(exey) = (exey)γ , 0 < γ < 1, and c(ekx + e
k
y) = (e
k
x + e
k
y)
2/2. One can show that the
generalist’s preferred equity share is then defined by α̂g·s = 1/(2γ).30 Thus, actual idea stealing
occurs whenever γ ≤ 1/2, and the threat to steal the idea when γ > 1/2. We define α∗g·s as the
Nash bargaining outcome for the generalist, with 1− α̂s·g < α∗g·s < α̂g·s(< 1), where α̂s·g is the
specialist’s preferred equity share. The expected joint utility of the generalist-specialist team
under delayed contracting, denoted U stealJ , is then given by
U stealJ−R =
 U
solo if α̂g·s = 1
U stealg (α
∗
g·s) + U
steal
s (1− α∗g·s) if α̂g·s < 1,
where U stealg is the expected utility of the generalist in case of threatened idea stealing, and
U steals is the expected utility of the specialist.
It is easy to see that the parameter Θ in the condition from Proposition 1 now becomes
Θ =
U solo − UdudJ−R
2Udream − U stealJ−R
. (7)
Whether the new Θ is higher or lower depends on whether renegotiation occurs in a dud team
and/or a generalist-specialist team. This in turn will shift the boundary in Figure 2 either up-
wards or downwards. However, the key insight remains the same: The founders choose to
contract upfront whenever they are likely to develop the critical skills (ρ1 ≥ ρ̂1(ρ2)). Otherwise
they delay the formal contracting.
30The proof is available from the authors upon request.
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Proof of Proposition 2.
Note that
ρ+1 =
[ρ1ρ2 + ρ1(1− ρ2)] η
[ρ1ρ2 + ρ1(1− ρ2)] η + [1− ρ1ρ2 − ρ1(1− ρ2)] (1− η) =
ρ1η
ρ1η + (1− ρ1)(1− η)
ρ+2 =
[ρ1ρ2 + ρ2(1− ρ1)] η
[ρ1ρ2 + ρ2(1− ρ1)] η + [1− ρ1ρ2 − ρ2(1− ρ1)] (1− η) =
ρ2η
ρ2η + (1− ρ2)(1− η) .
Likewise,
ρ−1 =
ρ1(1− η)
ρ1(1− η) + (1− ρ1)η ρ
−
2 =
ρ2(1− η)
ρ2(1− η) + (1− ρ2)η .
Let α(Γ+,Γ−) denote the equity share for the positive-signal founder. Moreover, we define α̂j·k
as the equity share which maximizes the expected utility of a type j-founder when his partner
is of type k, with j, k ∈ {g, s, i}. Suppose the generalist in a dud team has the positive signal.
The expected joint utility is
UdudJ(g) ≡
{
Ug·i(α(Γ+,Γ−)) + Ui·g(1− α(Γ+,Γ−)) if α(Γ+,Γ−) ≥ 1− α̂i·g
Ug·i(α∗g·i(α(Γ
+,Γ−))) + Ui·g(1− α∗g·i(α(Γ+,Γ−))) if α(Γ+,Γ−) < 1− α̂i·g,
which depends on whether renegotiation occurs (α ≥ 1− α̂i·g) or not (α < 1− α̂i·g). Because
dα∗g·s(·)/dα > 0, we have dUdudJ(g)/dα > 0. Now suppose the ineffective partner in a dud team
has the positive signal. The expected joint utility is
UdudJ(i) ≡
{
Ududg (1− α(Γ+,Γ−)) + Ududi (α(Γ+,Γ−)) if α(Γ+,Γ−) ≤ α̂i·g
Ududg (1− α∗i·g(α(Γ+,Γ−))) + Ududi (α∗i·g(α(Γ+,Γ−))) if α(Γ+,Γ−) > α̂i·g,
which also depends on whether renegotiation occurs (α > α̂i·g) or not (α ≤ α̂i·g). Because
dα∗g·i(·)/dα < 0, we have dUdudJ(i)(·)/dα < 0. Finally consider a (j − l) dream team, with
j, l ∈ {g, s}, where founder j has the positive signal. The expected joint utility is
UdreamJ(j·l) ≡
{
Udreamj·l (α(Γ
+,Γ−)) + Udreaml·j (1− α(Γ+,Γ−)) if α(Γ+,Γ−) ≤ α̂j·l
Udreamj·l (α
∗
j·l(α(Γ
+,Γ−))) + Udreamj·l (1− α∗j·l(α(Γ+,Γ−))) if α(Γ+,Γ−) > α̂j·l,
which, again, depends on whether renegotiation occurs (α > α̂j·l) or not (α ≤ α̂j·l). Clearly,
dα∗j·l(·)/dα > 0. Thus, dUdreamJ(j·l) (·)/dα < 0.
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We can now derive the optimal vesting scheme α∗(Γ+,Γ−). For parsimony, we make the
following definitions: gk ≡ ρk1ρk2, k ∈ {+,−} (founder is generalist), sk ≡ ρk1ρk2 (founder
has main skill), and tk ≡ ρk1ρk2 (founder has secondary skill; transpose). Moreover, we define
λk ≡ gk + sk + tk (founder is skilled). If Γ = {Γ+,Γ−}, the positive-signal founder is skilled
and the negative-signal founder is unskilled with probability η2. We can focus on the case
where the skilled founder is a generalist as in all other cases the expected payoff is zero. Thus,
the expected joint utility is g
+
λ+
(1 − λ−)UdudJ(g). With probability η¯2, the positive-signal founder
is unskilled, and the negative-signal founder skilled. We can again focus on the case where
the skilled founder is a generalist. Thus, the expected joint utility is g
−
λ− (1 − λ+)UdudJ(i). With
probability ηη¯, both founders are skilled. We then have the following potential constellations
where the first founder has the positive signal: (i) (x-specialist; y-specialist) or (y-specialist;
x-specialist) with probability (s+s− + t+t−)/(λ+λ−), (ii) (x-specialist; x-specialist) or (y-
specialist; y-specialist) with probability (s+t− + s−t+)/(λ+λ−), (iii) (generalist; y-specialist)
or (generalist; x-specialist) with probability g+(s−+ t−)/(λ+λ−), (iv) (x-specialist; generalist)
or (y-specialist; generalist) with probability g−(s+ + t+)/(λ+λ−); and (v), (generalist; gener-
alist) with probability g+g−/(λ+λ−). Thus, with probability ηη¯, the expected joint utility is
1/(λ+λ−)UdreamJ , where
UdreamJ ≡ (s+s− + t+t−)UdreamJ(s·s) + g+(s− + t−)UdreamJ(g·s) + g−(s+ + t+)UdreamJ(s·g) + g+g−UdreamJ(g·g) .
With probability η¯η, both founders are unskilled. The expected joint utility is then 0. The total
expected joint utility, denoted EUJ(α(Γ+,Γ−)), is thus given by
EUJ(α(Γ+,Γ−)) = η2
g+
λ+
(1− λ−)UdudJ(g) + (1− η)2
g−
λ−
(1− λ+)UdudJ(i) + η(1− η)
1
λ+λ−
UdreamJ .
The optimal equity share for the positive-signal founder, denoted α∗(η), is characterized by the
first-order condition:
η2
g+
λ+
(1− λ−) dU
dud
J(g)
dα︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+(1− η)2 g
−
λ−
(1− λ+) dU
dud
J(i)
dα︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+η(1− η) 1
λ+λ−
dUdreamJ
dα︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
= 0. (8)
We now show that dα∗(η)/dη > 0 as long as (8) is satisfied. Note that dUdreamJ(g·s) /dα =
dUdreamJ(g·g) /dα for α ≥ 1/2 because both positive-signal founders (generalists) exert the same
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total effort, and can choose any effort allocation at the same cost. Using this observation, we
can re-write (8) as follows:
Φ ≡ η
1− η (1− λ
−)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡φ1
dUdudJ(g)
dα
+
1− η
η
g−
λ−
λ+
g+
(1− λ+)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡φ2
dUdudJ(i)
dα
+
dUdreamJ(g·s)
dα
+
λ+
g+
s+s− + t+t−λ+λ−︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡φ3
dUdreamJ(s·s)
dα
+
g−(s+ + t+)
λ+λ−︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡φ4
dUdreamJ(s·g)
dα

︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Ω
= 0. (9)
Implicit differentiation yields
dα∗(η)
dη
=
∂φ1
∂η
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
dUdudJ(g)
dα
+∂φ2
∂η
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
dUdudJ(i)
dα
+ ∂
∂η
(
λ+
g+
) <0︷︸︸︷
Ω +λ
+
g+
[∂φ3
∂η
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
dUdreamJ(s·s)
dα
+∂φ4
∂η
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
dUdreamJ(s·g)
dα
]
−dΦ
dα
, (10)
where the denominator must be strictly negative due to the second-order condition. Thus,
dα∗(η)/dη > 0 if the numerator of (10) is strictly positive. For this, it is sufficient to show
that (i) ∂φ1/∂η > 0, (ii) ∂φ2/∂η < 0, (iii) ∂(λ+/g+)/∂η < 0, (iv) ∂φ3/∂η < 0; and (v)
∂φ4/∂η < 0. Consider first φ1. Clearly, η/(1 − η) is increasing in η. Moreover, note that
λ− = ρ−1 −ρ−1 ρ−2 +ρ−2 . Thus, ∂λ−/∂η = ∂ρ−1 /∂η(1−ρ−2 ) +∂ρ−2 /∂η(1−ρ−1 ), which is strictly
negative because ∂ρ−1 /∂η, ∂ρ
−
2 /∂η < 0. Thus, (1 − λ−) is increasing in η. Likewise, one can
show that ∂(1 − λ+)/∂η < 0. Therefore, ∂φ1/∂η > 0. Now consider φ2. Clearly, (1 − η)/η
is decreasing in η. Moreover, we can write λ−/g− = 1/ρ−2 + 1/ρ
−
1 − 1. Because ∂ρ−1 /∂η,
∂ρ−2 /∂η < 0, we have ∂(λ
−/g−)/∂η > 0. Thus, ∂(g−/λ−)/∂η < 0. Likewise, one can show
that ∂(λ+/g+)/∂η < 0 as ∂ρ+1 /∂η, ∂ρ
+
2 /∂η > 0. These observations imply that ∂φ2/∂η < 0.
Now consider φ3. We can write
s+s−
λ+λ−
=
ρ+1 (1− ρ+2 )ρ−1 (1− ρ−2 )(
ρ+1 − ρ+1 ρ+2 + ρ+2
) (
ρ−1 − ρ−1 ρ−2 + ρ−2
) = 1−ρ+2ρ+2 1−ρ−2ρ−2(
1
ρ+2
− 1 + 1
ρ+1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡χ+
(
1
ρ−2
− 1 + 1
ρ−1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡χ−
.
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Using the definitions of ρ+1 and ρ
+
2 , we get
1− ρ+2
ρ+2
=
1− ρ2
ρ2
· 1− η
η
1− ρ−2
ρ−2
=
1− ρ2
ρ2
· η
1− η .
Let χ ≡ χ+χ−. Thus,
∂
∂η
(
s+s−
λ+λ−
)
=
∂
∂η
 (1−ρ2)2ρ22
χ
 = − (1−ρ2)2ρ22 ∂χ∂η
χ2
. (11)
Clearly, ∂
∂η
(
s+s−
λ+λ−
)
< 0 if ∂χ/∂η > 0. We get
∂χ
∂η
=
[
− 1(
ρ+2
)2 ∂ρ+2∂η − 1(ρ+1 )2 ∂ρ
+
1
∂η
]
χ− +
[
− 1(
ρ−2
)2 ∂ρ−2∂η − 1(ρ−1 )2 ∂ρ
−
1
∂η
]
χ+.
It is straightforward to show that
1(
ρ+2
)2 ∂ρ+2∂η = 1− ρ2ρ2 · 1η2 1(ρ+1 )2 ∂ρ
+
1
∂η
=
1− ρ1
ρ1
1
η2
1(
ρ−2
)2 ∂ρ−2∂η = −1− ρ2ρ2 · 1(1− η)2 1(ρ−1 )2 ∂ρ
−
1
∂η
= −1− ρ1
ρ1
1
(1− η)2 .
Thus, ∂χ/∂η > 0 if η2χ+ > χ−(1− η)2. Simple transformation yields
χ+ = 1 +
ρ1(1− ρ2)(1− η) + ρ2(1− ρ1)(1− η)
ρ1ρ2η
χ− = 1 +
ρ1(1− ρ2)η + ρ2(1− ρ1)η
ρ1ρ2(1− η) .
Hence, the condition η2χ+ > χ−(1− η)2 can be written as
η2 +
[ρ1(1− ρ2)(1− η) + ρ2(1− ρ1)(1− η)] η
ρ1ρ2
> (1− η)2 + [ρ1(1− ρ2)η + ρ2(1− ρ1)η] (1− η)
ρ1ρ2
⇔ η2 > (1− η)2,
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which is always satisfied for η > 1/2. Thus, ∂χ/∂η > 0. This implies that ∂
∂η
(
s+s−
λ+λ−
)
< 0.
Likewise, one can show that ∂
∂η
(
t+t−
λ+λ−
)
< 0. Consequently, ∂φ3/∂η < 0. Finally consider φ4.
We can write
g−s+
λ+λ−
=
ρ−1 ρ
−
2 ρ
+
1 (1− ρ+2 )(
ρ+1 − ρ+1 ρ+2 + ρ+2
) (
ρ−1 − ρ−1 ρ−2 + ρ−2
) = 1−ρ+2ρ+2
χ
.
Using that (1− ρ+2 )/ρ+2 = [(1− ρ2)(1− η)]/(ρ2η), we get
∂
∂η
(
g−s+
λ+λ−
)
=
∂
∂η
(
1−ρ2
ρ2
· 1−η
η
χ
)
=
−1−ρ2
ρ2
[
1
η2
χ+ 1−η
η
∂χ
∂η
]
χ2
.
Because ∂χ/∂η > 0, we have ∂
∂η
(
g−s+
λ+λ−
)
< 0. Likewise, one can show that ∂
∂η
(
g−t+
λ+λ−
)
< 0.
Consequently, ∂φ4/∂η < 0. Thus, dα∗(η)/dη > 0 as long as (8) is satisfied.
We now evaluate (9) at the extreme values η ∈ {1/2, 1}. Suppose η = 1. Then, (9)
simplifies to dUdudJ(g)/dα = 0. Since dU
dud
J(g)/dα > 0, we get a corner solution with α
∗(1) = 1.
Because dα∗(η)/dη > 0 and the fact that (9) cannot be satisfied for η → 1, there must exist
a threshold η, with η < 1, such that α∗(η) = 1 for η > η. Now suppose η = 1/2. Note that
ρ+1 = ρ
−
1 = ρ1 and ρ
+
2 = ρ
−
2 = ρ2 for η = 1/2, and thus λ
+ = λ− ≡ λ. Consequently, (9)
simplifies to
dUdudJ(g)
dα
+
dUdudJ(i)
dα
+
dUdreamJ(g·s)
dα
+
s2 + t2
gλ
dUdreamJ(s·s)
dα
+
s+ t
λ
dUdreamJ(s·g)
dα
= 0. (12)
Keep in mind that dα∗(η)/dη > 0 implies that a solution to (12) must be unique. Moreover,
note that
dUdudJ(g)
dα
∣∣∣∣∣
α=1/2
= − dU
dud
J(i)
dα
∣∣∣∣∣
α=1/2
.
We now show that dUdreamJ(j·l) /dα
∣∣∣
α=1/2
= 0, with j, l ∈ {g, s}. W.l.o.g. suppose that founder A
has at least the x-skill, and founder B at least the y-skill. We can then write the joint utility for
a given equity allocation α as
UA(α) + UB(1− α) = αpiµ(exey)− c(eAx + eAy ) + (1− α)piµ(exey)− c(eBx + eBy ).
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Using the Envelope Theorem, we get the following condition which characterizes the jointly
efficient equity allocation αJ :
α
[
∂µ(·)
∂eBx
deBx
dα
(
eAy + e
B
y
)
+
∂µ(·)
∂eBy
deBy
dα
(
eAx + e
B
x
)]
= −(1−α)
[
∂µ(·)
∂eAx
deAx
dα
(
eAy + e
B
y
)
+
∂µ(·)
∂eAy
deAy
dα
(
eAx + e
B
x
)]
,
where deAx /dα ≥ 0, deAy /dα ≥ 0, deBx /dα ≤ 0, and deBy /dα ≤ 0; with strict equality in case
the founder does not possess the relevant skill. Suppose α = 1/2. Then, because only total ef-
fort matters, eAx = e
B
y > 0, e
A
y = e
B
x = 0, de
B
y /dα = −deAx /dα, and ∂µ(·)/∂eBy = ∂µ(·)/∂eAx .
Thus, for α = 1/2, the first-order condition is satisfied. This implies that αJ = 1/2 is a max-
imum. Because founders’ disutility c(·) is convex in total effort, αJ = 1/2 is also a global
maximum. Thus, dUdreamJ(j·l) /dα
∣∣∣
α=1/2
= 0, with j, l ∈ {g, s}. Consequently, α = 1/2 satisfies
(12) for η = 1/2. Because dα∗(η)/dη > 0, we have α∗(η) > 1/2 for all η > 1/2. 2
Optimal Contingent Contract for two Symmetric Signals.
Suppose both signals are symmetric ({Γ+A,Γ+B} and {Γ−A,Γ−B}). Because both founders are
symmetric when writing the contract upfront at date 0, and the IP rights are allocated to the
firm, only the following two scenarios are possible: First, the contract can stipulate to dissolve
the firm. Both founders can then decide whether to pursue the business opportunity alone, or to
stay together. Second, the contract can preserve the team with the symmetric equity allocation
α∗ = 1/2. The next proposition specifies the optimal contingent contract for symmetric signals.
Proposition 8 Suppose the signals are symmetric.
(i) It is optimal to dissolve the venture whenever (ρ−1 , ρ
−
2 ) (two negative signals) or (ρ
+
1 , ρ
+
2 )
(two positive signals) satisfy the condition for delayed contracting (see Proposition 1).
Otherwise, it is always optimal to preserve the team with α∗ = 1/2.
(ii) Define ρ̂ i1(ρ
i
2), i ∈ {+,−}, such that f(ρ̂ i1 , ρi2) = Θ. Then ρ̂ +1 (ρ+2 ) is decreasing in the
signal precision η with ρ̂ +1 (ρ
+
2 ) = ρ̂1(ρ2) for η = 1/2, while ρ̂
−
1 (ρ
−
2 ) is decreasing in η
with ρ̂ −1 (ρ
−
2 ) = ρ̂1(ρ2) for η = 1/2.
Proof: First suppose Γ = {Γ+A,Γ+B}. If the team is kept together with α∗ = 1/2, the
expected utility of founder f = A,B is given by
EU fu (ρ
+
1 , ρ
+
2 ) =
[
(ρ+1 ρ
+
2 )
2 + (2ρ+1 ρ
+
2 )(ρ
+
1 ρ¯
+
2 + ρ
+
2 ρ¯
+
1 ) + (ρ
+
1 ρ¯
+
2 )
2 + (ρ¯+1 ρ
+
2 )
2
]
Udream
+ρ+1 ρ¯
+
1 ρ¯
+
2 U
dud
J ,
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where ρ¯+1 = 1− ρ+1 and ρ¯+2 = 1− ρ+2 . Likewise, if the venture will be dissolved, the expected
utility of founder f = A,B is
EU fd (ρ
+
1 , ρ
+
2 ) =
[
ρ+1 ρ
+
2 ρ¯
+
1 ρ¯
+
2 + (ρ
+
1 )
2ρ+2 ρ¯
+
2 + ρ
+
1 (ρ
+
2 )
2ρ¯+1
]
U solo
+
[
(ρ+1 ρ
+
2 )
2 + (ρ+1 )
2(ρ¯+2 )
2 + (ρ+2 )
2(ρ¯+1 )
2
]
Udream.
Notice that we get the same expected utility levels as in the absence of verifiable signals, with
the exception that we now have the updated probability ρ+1 instead of ρ1, and ρ
+
2 instead of ρ2.
Thus, we can infer from Proposition 1 that the venture will be dissolved if
f(ρ+1 , ρ
+
2 ) ≡
ρ+1
1− ρ+1
+
ρ+2
1− ρ+2
≤ Θ. (13)
Define ρ̂+1 (ρ
+
2 ) such that f(ρ̂
+
1 , ρ
+
2 ) = Θ. Recall from Proposition 1 that ∂ρ̂1(ρ2)/∂ρ2 < 0 and
note that ∂ρ+2 /∂η > 0. Thus, ∂ρ̂
+
1 /∂η < 0. Finally note that limη→1 ρ
+
1 = limη→1 ρ
+
2 = 1.
Thus, (13) cannot be satisfied for η → 1. Now suppose Γ = {Γ−A,Γ−B}. It is straightforward to
show that the venture will be dissolved if
f(ρ−1 , ρ
−
2 ) ≡
ρ−1
1− ρ−1
+
ρ−2
1− ρ−2
≤ Θ. (14)
Define ρ̂−1 (ρ
−
2 ) such that f(ρ̂
−
1 , ρ
−
2 ) = Θ. It is straightforward to show that ∂ρ̂
−
1 /∂η > 0.
Moreover, limη→1 ρ−1 = limη→1 ρ
−
2 = 0. Hence, (14) is always satisfied for η → 1. 2
When both founders are sufficiently likely to have some skills, it is always optimal to pre-
serve the team in order to prevent opportunistic behavior of a generalist. To what extent the
dissolution of the venture is optimal in order to prevent the dud team problem, depends on the
quality of the signals. For uninformative signals (η = 1/2), it does not matter whether both
signals are positive or negative; dissolving the venture is always optimal if ρ1 < ρ̂1.31 The more
informative the signals, the smaller the region where dissolving the venture is optimal for two
positive signals, and the larger the region where a dissolution is optimal for two negative sig-
nals (as ∂ρ̂ +1 /∂η < 0 and ∂ρ̂
−
1 /∂η > 0). For sufficiently precise signals (η → 1), keeping the
team together with α∗ = 1/2 is always optimal in case of two positive signals (Γ = {Γ+A,Γ+B}),
and dissolving the venture is always optimal in case of two negative signals (Γ = {Γ−A,Γ−B}).
Note also that founders prefer delayed contracting for sufficiently low values of ρ1 and ρ2. In
fact, the result on the dissolution of the venture in case of two positive signals only applies to a
31In fact, founders would then never write a contract upfront; see Proposition 1.
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parameter region where the founders would prefer delayed contracting anyway.
Proof of Proposition 3.
We define ρ̂ s1 (η) as the threshold between upfront and delayed contracting in the presence of
verifiable signals. Suppose η = 1/2. Recall from Proof of Proposition 2 that ρ+1 = ρ
−
1 = ρ1 and
ρ+2 = ρ
−
2 = ρ2 for η = 1/2, and α
∗ = 1/2. This implies that ρ̂+1 (ρ
+
2 ) = ρ̂
−
1 (ρ
−
2 ) = ρ̂1(ρ2) for
η = 1/2. Thus, the expected utility of upfront contracting with signals, denoted EU su(η), equals
the expected utility of upfront contracting without signals, EUu, for η = 1/2. Consequently,
ρ̂ s1 (η) = ρ̂1 for η = 1/2. Delayed contracting is thus optimal for η = 1/2 when the condition
from Proposition 1 is satisfied. Now suppose that η > 1/2. We know from Proposition 2 that
dα∗/dη > 0 for upfront contracting. Thus, dEU su(η)/dη > 0. This has the following two
implications: (i) ρ̂ s1 (η) < ρ̂1 for all η > 1/2; and (ii), dρ̂
s
1 (η)/dη < 0. Finally suppose that
η = 1. Then we know from Proposition 2 that α∗ = 1. Thus, UdudJ (α
∗ = 1) = U solo. Moreover,
note that η = 1 ensures that only an ineffective founder in a dud team loses his vested shares.
Because α∗(η = 1) = 1, it is then straightforward to show that EU su(η = 1) > EUd for all ρ1,
ρ2 > 0. 2
Proof of Proposition 4.
We can write the founders’ expected utilities as
UA(dA, α) = dA + αµ(exey)pi − c(eAx + eAy ) (15)
UB(dB, α) = dB + (1− α)µ(exey)pi − c(eBx + eBy ), (16)
where dB = piL − dA. Note that both founders are symmetric at date 0, so the optimal ex-ante
contract must be symmetric: d∗A = d
∗
B = piL/2 and α
∗ = 1/2. Now consider upfront con-
tracting, and suppose that A turns out to be a generalist at date 1, and B is ineffective. The
contract stipulates the equity allocation α = 1/2, while the jointly efficient equity allocation is
α = 1. From (15) and (16) we can see that the debt claims dA and dB do not affect the gener-
alist’s effort incentives. The generalist can offer the ineffective partner some of his debt claim
in exchange for some equity. Thus, as long as piL > 0 (which implies dA > 0) renegotiation
leads to a Pareto improvement. Let dA−B(αB−A) denote the debt claim that A transfers to B in
exchange for the equity stake αB−A, where dA−B(αB−A) needs to satisfy dA−B(αB−A) ≤ piL/2
and UB(piL/2 + dA−B(αB−A), 1/2− αB−A) ≥ UB(piL/2, 1/2). Joint surplus is maximized for
αB−A = 1/2, so that α = 1. Let piL denote the required value of piL so that αB−A = 1/2, where
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piL > 0. Thus, for piL ≥ piL the renegotiation outcome is α∗ = 1 and d∗B > d∗A ≥ 0. And for
piL < piL we have 1/2 < α∗ < 1 and d∗B = piL > d
∗
A = 0.
Now consider delayed contracting, and suppose that A is a generalist and B is a specialist.
Consider the pure idea stealing scenario with α̂g·s = 1. Joint surplus can be improved if the
generalist transferred some equity to the specialist, so that also the specialist exerts some effort
(where joint surplus is maximized at α = 1/2). However, since α̂g·s = 1 this requires the spe-
cialist to compensate the generalist for his lost utility. Recall that the generalist gets δpiL of the
downside returns under idea stealing, while the specialist gets (1− δ)piL. Thus, renegotiation is
only Pareto improving if δ < 1. If δ = 1 we have α∗ = 1 and d∗A = piL > d
∗
B = 0. Suppose
δ < 1, and let dB−A(αA−B) denote the debt claim that B transfers to A in exchange for the
equity stake αA−B. Joint surplus is maximized when αA−B = 1/2. Define ̂̂piL as the required
value of piL so that αA−B = 1/2. It is easy to see that ̂̂piL is increasing in δ. Thus, for piL ≥ ̂̂piL
the equilibrium contract is given by α∗ = 1/2 and piL ≥ d∗A > 0 and d∗B ≥ 0. Moreover,
for piL < ̂̂piL we have α∗ ∈ (1/2, 1) and d∗A = piL > d∗B = 0. Now consider idea stealing
threatened. The only difference to pure idea stealing is that for δ = 1 the generalist keeps the
entire downside return piL, but now offers the specialist an equity share, so that α∗ ∈ (1/2, 1).2
Proof of Proposition 5.
First consider upfront contracting. Suppose the investor could offer a contingent contract
with (i) Idream in case of a dream team, and (ii) Idud in case of a dud team. Consider first the
dream team. Note that γ(I) would then be defined by
µdream(ex(γ)ey(γ))γpi = I.
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The two founders would choose I , with I ≥ K, to maximize 2Udream(γ(I), I). LetEU Iu denote
the expected utility of the outside investor. Noting that EU Iu = 0 in equilibrium, the optimal
investment Idream maximizes EUJ ≡ EUAu + EUBu + EU Iu , which can be written as
EUJ(I) =
1− γ(I)
2
µdream(ex(γ(I))ey(γ(I)))pi +
I
2
− c(eAx (γ(I)) + eAy (γ(I)))
+
1− γ(I)
2
µdream(ex(γ(I))ey(γ(I)))pi +
I
2
− c(eBx (γ(I)) + eBy (γ(I)))
+µdream(ex(γ(I))ey(γ(I)))γ(I)pi − I
=
1
2
µdream(ex(γ(I))ey(γ(I)))pi − c(eAx (γ(I)) + eAy (γ(I)))
+
1
2
µdream(ex(γ(I))ey(γ(I)))pi − c(eBx (γ(I)) + eBy (γ(I)))
= 2Udream(γ(I)).
Because dex(γ)/dγ < 0 and dey(γ)/dγ < 0, we have dUdream(γ)/dγ < 0. Thus, Idream = K,
so that γ = γ(K). Now consider the dud team. Note that γ(I) is then defined by
µdud(ex(γ)ey(γ))γpi = I. (17)
Suppose that only the ineffective partner receives the excess payment I −K and has to give up
the equity share γ. The expected utility of the ineffective partner is then
Ududi (γ(I), I −K) =
(
1
2
− γ(I)
)
µdud(exey)pi + I −K.
Using (17) we get
Ududi (γ(I), I −K) =
1
2
µdud(exey)pi −K,
which only depends onK. Thus, raising the extra amount I−K does not affect UdudJ in case the
ineffective partner gets I in exchange for the equity stake γ(I). Now suppose that the generalist
receives the payment I and has to give up γ. It is then optimal for the generalist to use I −K to
buy as much equity from the ineffective partner as possible. From the above we can infer that
the generalist would give up exactly γ(I)− γ(K) in exchange for I −K, so that in equilibrium
the generalist is back to his initial equity share 1/2. Thus, raising the extra capital I −K does
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not affect UdudJ in case the generalist gets I in exchange for giving up γ(I). Overall this implies
that Idud = K, so that γ = γ(K). Because Idream = Idud = K in case of a contingent contract,
it must also hold that I∗u = K in the absence of a contingent contract.
Now consider delayed contracting. We first note that any transfer from the specialist to
the generalist must maximize joint surplus; otherwise the generalist would always reject the
specialist’s offer. LetEU Id denote the expected utility of the outside investor. Recall thatEU
I
d =
0 in equilibrium; thus, I∗d maximizesEUJ(I) ≡ EUAd +EUBd +EU Id . Without loss of generality,
let founder A be the generalist, and founder B the specialist. Noting that (1 − γ(I))pi is the
remaining total payoff for A and B, we can write EUJ(I) as
EUJ(I) = (1− γ(I))αg·s(I)µ(ex(γ(I))ey(γ(I)))pi + I −K − c(eAx (γ(I)) + eAy (γ(I)))
+(1− γ(I))(1− αg·s(I))µ(ex(γ(I))ey(γ(I)))pi − c(eBx (γ(I)) + eBy (γ(I)))
+µ(ex(γ)ey(γ))γpi − (I −K)
= (1− γ(I))αg·s(I)µ(ex(γ(I))ey(γ(I)))pi − c(eAx (γ(I)) + eAy (γ(I)))
+ (1− αg·s(I) (1− γ(I)))µ(ex(γ(I))ey(γ(I)))pi − c(eBx (γ(I)) + eBy (γ(I)))
= Ug·s(αg·s(I), γ(I)) + Us·g(αg·s(I), γ(I)).
We note that dαg·s(I)/dI < 0. Because γ′(I) > 0, we then have deAx /dI , de
A
y /dI < 0. More-
over, note that the total surplus that is split between both founders, (1 − γ(I))pi, is decreasing
in I . Thus, d(eAx + e
B
x )/dI , d(e
A
y + e
B
y )/dI < 0. Consequently, d [Ug·s(·) + Us·g(·)] /dI < 0,
which implies I∗d = K. 2
Outside Investors – Alternative Contracts.
Let Ψu ≡ {αu(K), βu(K), γu(K)} denote the optimal contract under upfront contracting
when I = K (see Proposition 5), and Ψd ≡ {αd(K), βd(K), γd(K)} the optimal contract under
delayed contracting, where A gets α, B gets β, and the outside investor gets γ. We now show
that there exits no alternative contract Ψ′j , j ∈ {u, d}, that is strictly Pareto superior to the
contract Ψj .
Consider upfront contracting. We first note that the contract Ψu, with αu(K) = βu(K) =
(1− γu(K))/2, maximizes the joint surplus of dream teams. We can therefore focus on the dud
team. W.l.o.g. suppose that A is the generalist and B ineffective. Recall that dUJ/dαu > 0,
with UJ = UA + UB + U I . Thus, a Pareto superior contract must comprise an equity stake
α′u for A with α
′
u = αu(K) + εu, εu > 0. We denote this contract by Ψ
′
u. This contract then
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requires that β′u + γ
′
u = βu(K) + γu(K) − εu, i.e., either B or the investor, or both, need to
relinquish some equity. Because β̂ = α̂i·g ≥ 1/2, as assumed for our base model, we have
UB(β′u) < U
B(βu(K)). Thus, the investor needs to make a transfer payment to B in order
to compensate him for his loss of utility. Recall that B and the investor are both unproductive.
Thus, making a transfer payment toB is equivalent to transferring some of the investor’s equity,
which we denote by γu. Moreover, both being unproductive implies that B and the investor
have symmetric preferences with respect to their own equity stakes, so that β̂ = γ̂ ≥ 1/2. Thus,
dU I/dγu < 0, so that for any γu > 0 the investor’s zero-profit condition is violated. This also
implies that it is never optimal for the outside investor to transfer some of his equity directly
to A. Consequently, there exits no alternative contract Ψ′u, with Ψ
′
u 6= Ψu, which is Pareto
superior.
For delayed contracting we know that the contract Ψd maximizes the joint surplus of dream
teams. Thus, we can focus on a generalist-specialist team, where the generalist steals the idea.
W.l.o.g. suppose that A is the generalist and B the specialist. Recall that dUJ/dβ > 0 for
β ∈ [0, 1/2). Thus, a Pareto superior contract must consist of an equity stake β′d > 0 for
B; we denote this contract by Ψ′d. Note that offering β
′
d > 0 then requires that α
′
d + γ
′
d =
αd(K) + γd(K) − εd i.e., either A or the investor, or both, need to give up some equity. The
generalist (A) prefers the equity stake α̂ = 1, so that giving up some his equity requires com-
pensation from the investor. Note that the investor would then prefer transferring equity as a
compensation (instead of making a lump sum payment), as this also improves the generalist’s
effort incentives. Moreover, for any fixed β < 1 it is easy to see that the investor’s expected
utility U I(γ) is strictly increasing in γ for γ < γ̂, and decreasing in γ for γ ≥ γ̂ (this is because
the investor behaves exactly as the ineffective partner in a dud team). Thus, there exist two
values of γ that satisfy the investor’s zero-profit condition (U I(γ) = K), which we denote for
now γ1(K) and γ2(K), with γ1(K) < γ2(K). Note that the founders always offer the investor
γ(K) ≡ γ1(K) in order to maximize their own expected utilities. Thus, dU I(γ)/dγ > 0 for
the relevant parameter range. This implies that it is never optimal for the outside investor to
relinquish some of his equity (to either compensate A or to increase B’s stake). Consequently,
there exits no alternative contract Ψ′d which is strictly Pareto superior to Ψd.
Proof of Proposition 6.
First note that a higher Λ compromises the effort incentives of the generalist; thus, dU solo(1−
Λ)/dΛ < 0. Consider a generalist/ineffective team, and let UdudJ (Λ) ≡ U solo(1−Λ)+Ududi (Λ).
It follows immediately that dUdudJ (Λ)/dΛ < 0. Now consider a generalist/specialist team (idea
stealing), and let U stealJ (Λ) ≡ U solo(1 − Λ) + Us·g(Λ). Because the specialist obtains Λ after
the production stage, the entire effort is provided by the generalist. Thus, dU stealJ (Λ)/dΛ < 0.
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Following along the lines of Proof of Proposition 1, one can show that founder f = A,B prefers
to sign a contract upfront if
f(ρ1, ρ2) =
ρ1
1− ρ1 +
ρ2
1− ρ2 ≤ Θ(Λ), Θ(Λ) =
UdudJ (Λ)− UdudJ
2Udream − U stealJ (Λ)
.
Because dUdudJ (Λ)/dΛ < 0 and dU
steal
J (Λ)/dΛ < 0, it follows that dΘ(Λ)/dΛ < 0. More-
over, it is straightforward to show that Θ(0) = Θ. This implies that dρ̂1(ρ2,Λ)/dΛ < 0, with
ρ̂1(ρ2, 0) = ρ̂1(ρ2); see Proof of Proposition 1. 2
Founders’ Incentives to Invest in Skills.
Because of symmetry, we can focus on founder A’s incentives to invest in his main skill;
founder B’s incentives are identical. The expected utility of founder A is given by
EUA(sA) = ρA1 ρ2V11 + ρ
A
1 ρ¯2V10 + ρ¯
A
1 ρ2V01 + ρ¯
A
1 ρ¯2V00 − c(sA),
where
V11 = ρ
B
1 ρ2Ug·g +
(
ρB1 ρ¯2 + ρ¯
B
1 ρ2
)
Ug·s + ρ¯B1 ρ¯2Ug·i V00 = ρ
B
1 ρ2Ui·g
V10 = ρ
B
1 ρ2Us·g + ρ
B
1 ρ¯2Us·s V01 = ρ
B
1 ρ2Us·g + ρ¯
B
1 ρ2Us·s
Founder A’s optimal choice of sA is defined by the following first-order condition:
ψzA = c′(sA), (18)
where
zA = ρ2 (V11 − V01) + ρ¯2 (V10 − V00) .
We note that zA measures the strength of founder A’s incentives to develop his main skill. For
example, if some effort level sA satisfies (18) for upfront contracting so that ψzAu = c
′(sA), then
delayed contracting leads to a higher effort if and only if zAd > z
A
u at the same value of s
A. To
measure the relative strength of incentives we can therefore focus on ∆zA = zAd − zAu . Using
the utility levels for the various skill combinations under upfront and delayed contracting then
yields ∆zA.
To see this more formally, we use the symmetry condition ρA1 = ρ
B
1 ≡ ρ1 to simplify ∆zA:
∆zA = ρ2[ρ1ρ2(U
dream − U steals ) + ρ1ρ2Ω + ρ1ρ2(U stealg − Udream) + ρ1ρ2(U solo − Udwg )]
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where
Ω = Udwi + U
steal
J − 2Udream.
The term Ω depends on the shape of utility functions and can be positive or negative. We note
that ∆zA is always positive if Ω ≥ 0. Even for Ω < 0 the other three terms are likely to ensure
that ∆zA remains positive. In fact, ∆zA becomes negative only if ρ1ρ2 becomes the dominant
term among the four probability terms. This requires that both ρ1 is sufficiently large and ρ2 is
sufficiently small. The following lemma provides a more formal statement for this.
Lemma 1
(i) If Ω ≥ 0, then ∆zA > 0.
(ii) If Ω < 0 and ρ2 > ρ̂2 ≡ −ΩUdream−Usteals −Ω
(
< 1
2
)
, then ∆zA > 0.
(iii) If Ω < 0 and ρ2 ≤ ρ̂2, then there exists a threshold ρ̂1 so that ρ1 < ρ̂1 implies ∆zA > 0.
The threshold ρ̂1 is increasing in ρ2.
Proof: We first define
z˜ ≡ ρ1ρ2(Udream − U steals ) + ρ1ρ2Ω + ρ1ρ2(U stealg − Udream) + ρ1ρ2(U solo − Udwg ).
Clearly, ∆zA > 0 if z˜ > 0. Note that z˜ > 0 is satisfied whenever Ω ≥ 0. We now focus on
the case where Ω < 0, and derive conditions so that z˜ > 0 is still satisfied. We define ρ̂1 as the
value of ρ1 which satisfies z˜ = 0 for a given ρ2. Below we show that dρ̂1/dρ2 > 0. Thus, to find
the upper bound of ρ2 so that z˜ > 0, we can focus on the extreme case ρ1 = 1. The condition
z˜ > 0 then becomes
ρ2(U
dream − U steals ) + ρ2Ω > 0,
which is equivalent to
ρ2 >
−Ω
Udream − U steals − Ω
≡ ρ̂2.
Note that the denominator of ρ̂2 is strictly positive as Ω < 0. Using the definition of Ω we can
show that ρ̂2 < 1/2:
1
2
>
−Udwi − U steals − U stealg + 2Udream
Udream − U steals − Udwi − U steals − U stealg + 2Udream
⇔ Udwi + U stealg > Udream,
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which is always satisfied as U stealg > U
dream. Thus, ρ̂2 < 1/2. Next, we solve z˜ > 0 for ρ1:
ρ1 <
ρ2(U
steal
g − Udream) + ρ2(U solo − Udwg )
ρ2 (U
steal
J − 2Udream)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡y1
+ρ2 (U
solo − Udwg − Ω)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡y2
≡ ρ̂1.
Note that y1 < 0 and y2 > 0. Recall that ρ̂2 < 1/2. Thus, to show that the denominator of ρ̂1 is
always positive, we can evaluate the denominator at ρ2 = 1/2:
1
2
(U stealJ − 2Udream) +
1
2
(U solo − Udwg + 2Udream − Udwi − U stealJ ) > 0
⇔ (U solo − UdwJ ) > 0.
Finally we evaluate ρ̂1 at ρ2 = 0:
ρ̂1(ρ2 = 0) =
U solo − Udwg
U solo − Udwg − Ω
=
U solo − Udwg
(U solo − UdwJ ) + (2Udream − U stealJ )
< 1.
To summarize, we have ρ̂1(ρ2 = 0) < 1 = ρ̂1(ρ2 = ρ̂2).
Next, we show that dρ̂1/dρ2 > 0. Recall that ρ̂1 is defined by z˜ = 0. Implicit differentiating
ρ̂1 with respect to ρ2 yields
dρ̂1
dρ2
= −
dz˜
dρ2
dz˜
dρ1
.
Consider the derivative dz˜/dρ1:
dz˜
dρ1
= ρ2(U
dream − U steals ) + ρ2Ω− ρ2(U stealg − Udream)− ρ2(U solo − Udwg ).
Using z˜ = 0 we get
ρ2(U
dream − U steals ) + ρ2Ω = −
ρ1
ρ1
ρ2(U
steal
g − Udream)−
ρ1
ρ1
ρ2(U
solo − Udwg ).
Using this relationship we can rewrite dz˜/dρ1 as follows:
dz˜
dρ1
= −ρ1
ρ1
ρ2 (U
steal
g − Udream)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
−ρ1
ρ1
ρ2 (U
solo − Udwg )︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
−ρ2 (U stealg − Udream)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
−ρ2 (U solo − Udwg )︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
.
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Thus, dz˜/dρ1 < 0. Now consider the derivative dz˜/dρ2:
dz˜
dρ2
= ρ1(U
dream − U steals )− ρ1Ω + ρ1(U stealg − Udream)− ρ1(U solo − Udwg ).
Using z˜ = 0 we get
ρ1(U
dream − U steals ) + ρ1(U stealg − Udream) = −
ρ2
ρ2
[ρ1Ω + ρ1(U
solo − Udwg )].
Thus,
dz˜
dρ2
= −ρ2
ρ2
[ρ1Ω + ρ1(U
solo − Udwg )]− ρ1Ω− ρ1(U solo − Udwg )
=
[
−ρ2
ρ2
− 1
] [
ρ1Ω + ρ1(U
solo − Udwg )
]
= − 1
ρ2
[
ρ1Ω + ρ1(U
solo − Udwg )
]
.
Recall that at ρ2 = 0 we have
ρ̂1(ρ2 = 0) =
U solo − Udwg
U solo − Udwg − Ω
.
Therefore,
1− ρ̂1(ρ2 = 0) = −Ω
U solo − Udwg − Ω
.
Using ρ̂1(ρ2 = 0) and 1− ρ̂1(ρ2 = 0) we can write dz˜/dρ2 as
dz˜
dρ2
= − 1
ρ2
[
U solo − Udwg
U solo − Udwg − Ω
Ω +
−Ω
U solo − Udwg − Ω
(U solo − Udwg )
]
= 0.
This implies that dz˜/dρ2 > 0 for all ρ2 > 0. Thus, dρ̂1/dρ2 > 0. 2
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